HurricaneVision
Staff Writer
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- Nov 16, 2012
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As we move towards the start of the season and many of us get a needed dose of energy from the new staff, I wanted to take a look at how Miami fared in key metrics last year- as well as look at what the proposed solutions are from this staff.
Success Rate- Success Rate is a measurement of how often each play was successful, as determined with the following guidelines:
• On first down, you gain at least 50% of the yardage required for a new set of downs.
• On second down, you gain at least 70% of the yardage required.
• On third or fourth down, a first down is gained.
It seems fairly intuitive that if you are performing well on each down and staying ahead of the down and distance you will perform well on offense, and vice versa on defense. Last year, Miami ranked 47th out of 65 teams in success rate for offense (40.30%) and 52nd out of 65 teams for defense (45.5%).
Miami truly struggled in all aspects of this metric last year, but I wanted to see if I could identify where the team really needs to improve to impact their success rate the most, and how to improve their points per drive, which was far below average last year. I charted the plays for Miami against other P5 schools, as I wanted to create a more level playing field of talent/resources, thus removing games against the FCS and group of 5 teams played against. The first area that stands out is that Miami was woeful in short yardage rushing last year. I define short yardage rushing as any rushing attempt when three yards or fewer are required. Last year, Miami was 19-46 in such situations against P5 teams on offense (41.3%). Elite teams generally convert in the 65% range, and average is somewhere around 55% of the time. Miami was truly one of the worst in the entire nation in this regard. Here is how our players stacked up in this area:
-Yearby: 7-20 (35.0%)
-Walton: 6-17 (35.3%)
-Tucker: 0-1 (he actually fumbled it and Odogwu recovered for a TD)
-Rosier: 1-1
-Kaaya: 4-6 (66.7%)
-Gray: 1-1
As you can see, truly both of our RB’s struggled in this area. In all games, Yearby converted at a 36.4%, so this isn’t a small sample fluke. Gus Edwards converted at a much higher clip the previous year, and adding a FB who can block will help in short yardage situations. To get to just average production, Miami will need to convert seven more of those 46 opportunities into first downs. That is seven more opportunities to score TD’s that they didn’t receive last year. Seven more scoring chances in 10 games is a significant increase in your chances of winning those games.
Coach Richt prefers to run a gap rushing offense on short yardage plays. A gap rushing attack is also known as a power rushing attack (as opposed to a zone blocking scheme). His go-to play on short yardage rushing attempts is the Power-O play. To run this play effectively you need to have a solid interior offensive line. It is man-on-man blocking for the LT, and then the LG is going to pull towards the RT to “kick out” the LB from the B gap (the B gap is the gap between the RG and the RT). The most important blocker in this play is the LG, since he is the puller (you can flip the play and have the RG pull to the opposite as well, but in my charting, Richt runs it most often with the LG), but the next most important is the C because he has to get the 3-technique DT so he doesn’t simply follow the LG’s hip to the ball carrier in the backfield. The FB or H-Back kicks out the end to the playside and then the RB follows the G through the hole and cuts off his backside (whichever defender in the hole doesn’t go). It’s a great play, and is highly successful, and has been highly successful for Richt in his career. More in-depth reading of the Power-O can be found here.
On the defensive side of the ball, we were truly a train wreck last year. Teams were successful on 32-46 attempts against us last year (exactly the same number of opportunities our offense had in these situations). That comes out to 69.6%, which was dead last among all 65 P5 teams. I mentioned that an elite offense generally converts these plays 65% of the time, well the Miami defense was turning every team they played into an elite offense in these situations. We have all discussed the defensive scheme and its shortcomings ad nauseum, but this was truly the biggest drawback to the read and react soft base defense we ran last year. It was far too easy for our opponents to keep drives going by rushing the football. Manny Diaz defenses look to solve this problem by applying pressure in short yardage situations. By moving the DT’s into the A gaps, this provides resistance for the easiest way to convert short yardage rushing situations. Last year, our DT’s were responsible for both the A & B gaps, causing them to control the OL first, then move to make the tackle. It is very difficult to stop a run for a yard or less playing this technique as a defensive lineman. That means a LB has to fill the gap quickly, but also maintain integrity for their passing assignments. When you hear our players talking about having to “think” too much in the old scheme, this is where it hurt them in this situation. This new defense will be susceptible to “trap” plays, which allow the DL to get upfield, only to be blocked by a puller or a backside OL, but the play takes an extra second to run, providing more time for the other DL and perhaps LB’ers to get into the play. The new scheme will allow some runs to “pop” when the DL gets upfield and the OL can get to the second level, but I expect that success ratio above to improve dramatically (honestly, I believe this number will improve as much as any team in the country does next year). Stopping this play is the foundation for any successful defense, and has been job number one since Diaz and Kuligowski arrived on campus.
After the short yardage rushing conversion has been addressed, the next part of dramatically improving the success ratio of the team is to improve in the mid-yardage areas. Too often last year, Miami was faced with 3rd and long situations, which the team fared pretty well in, honestly. A lot of that goes to the playmaking ability of Brad Kaaya and the receivers. Coach Richt has an offense that is built to absolutely exploit this area, and allow an offense to stay on track with first downs. By now, we all are familiar with one of the staples of a Coach Richt passing offense; the shallow cross concept. To run this concept to its fullest capabilities, you need to have a shifty slot WR who is tough and can hold onto the ball, and then you need to have an athletic TE who is able to create yards after catch. To the far side, you want a big-play WR threat to keep a S occupied in most situations. To the boundary you want a versatile WR who can run just about route effectively. If it feels like Miami has the personnel to excel in this scheme, it’s because they do. Braxton Berrios is a perfect fit as the slot WR for the one actually running the shallow cross about two yards passed the LOS. David Njoku was born to run the option route for this offense. He will line up to the outside of the slot and run straight up field. The reason it’s nice to have a TE fill this spot is he will often be asked to block on the play when they throw it to the shallow crosser. When it doesn’t go to the crosser, Njoku will have the “option” of running a comeback route, designed to get 6-8 yards, or run an option off the outside shoulder of the defender if he tries to come up on the comeback route. Njoku’s size, frame, athleticism, and blocking ability makes his tailor made for this role. Stacy Coley is the versatile WR who can run any route. Ahmmon Richards is the deep threat to the backside in case the field CB decides to start peeking, or the FS doesn’t stay home in deep territory or tries to double Coley. This play is not designed to be a big play, so most often the target isn’t to the far WR, but it’s important to have that threat to keep the defense honest and allow the offense to keep getting those 5-10 yard plays consistently. This concept combined with the expected improvement in short rushing performance allows for Miami to expect a huge jump in success rate this upcoming season.
Success rate has the highest correlation to winning of any metric in football. With an r^2 above .70, it is statistically significant as well.
On the defensive side of the ball, this is where Diaz’ defense is most vulnerable. I expect Diaz defense to dramatically improve the number of sacks and tackles for losses our team achieves next year, and the fact that our corners will press a ton more will prevent a lot of those bubble screens and the QB standing up and throwing the ball to a WR with a CB 10yards off of him for easy yardage. This defense does have a hole in it though, and it is in the middle of the field where six to eight yard completions are achieved at a higher rate than the national average. This means that a lot of 2nd and 12’s become 3rd and 3’s in this defense. When these plays are incomplete is when the pressure can really be let loose on 3rd down and stops are made, but be prepared for a higher percentage of the 2nd and 3rd and longs to be converted than you’d like to see. It’s just the trade-off for the aggression that this defense will seek.
I still expect the success rate for the defense to improve dramatically based on the short yardage rushing defense improving and the sacks and tackles for losses taking a step forward.
For the offense to get to average, they will need to convert 27 more successful plays than last year (320 to 347). To make top-20, they will need to convert 42 more (44.4%). To make the top-10, they would need to convert 70 more plays. To get to the top spot they would need to convert 101 more plays successfully (51.7%).
Rushing Rate- This isn’t meant to simply look at the percentage of times Miami rushed the ball, but rather what an expected amount of rushing attempts would take place given the circumstances on the field and the projected success in those situations. Keep in mind I’ve already discussed above that Miami fared extremely poorly in short yardage rushing situations, but it also should be noted that Miami passed the ball in situations where rushing the ball would have higher odds of success. Their adjusted rushing rate of 46.3% falls in the 21st percentile nationally and shows that the playcalling really impacted our ability to sustain drives and score points last year. Conversely, Georgia had an adjusted rushing rate of 55.8%, showing that Richt is perfectly content with using his running game to setup favorable down and distance situations. Add to it that Richt should operate a much faster pace than Miami employed last year (or Georgia, for that matter) and you can see how the playcalling will open opportunities that were not present last year.
My research and the advanced metrics show that Coley was overmatched at a playcaller at this level. I do not believe that will be the case with Coach Richt based on metrics achieved during his time calling plays at Georgia.
Efficiency- Miami loses 142 targets from games against P5 schools. Here are the results of those targets:
Waters- 48 targets, 32 receptions. 66.7% catch rate. 501 yards for 10.4 yards/target. 17 first downs for a 53.1% first down rate per reception.
Scott- 61 targets, 40 receptions. 65.6% catch rate. 500 yards for 8.2 yards/target. 25 first downs for a 62.5% first down rate per reception.
Brady- 18 targets, 10 receptions. 55.6% catch rate. 123 yards for 6.8 yards/target. 6 first downs for a 60.0% first down rate per reception.
Cager- 15 targets, 8 receptions. 53.3% catch rate, 70 yards for 4.7 yards/target. 4 first downs for a 50.0% first down rate per reception.
Losing Herb Waters will hurt our offense, as his yards per target were quite good at 10.4. Rashawn Scott filled the role of a possession WR quite well, but was not dynamic on an efficiency level. Cager and Brady were bad in their efficiency numbers and are really not huge losses. It’s important to note role when analyzing efficiency numbers, as a slot WR will invariably have lower yards per target but should have a higher first down percentage.
Here is how the returning players fared last year:
Coley- 53 targets, 37 receptions. 69.8% catch rate. 624 yards for 11.8 yards/target. 24 first downs for a 64.9% first down rate per reception.
Berrios- 14 targets, 10 receptions. 71.4% catch rate. 73 yards for 5.2 yards/target. 3 first downs for a 30.0% first down rate per reception.
Njoku- 34 targets, 20 receptions. 58.8% catch rate. 347 yards for 10.2 yards/target. 12 first downs for a 60.0% first down rate per reception.
Dobard- 11 targets, 4 receptions. 36.4% catch rate. 51 yards for 4.6 yards/target. 2 first downs for a 50.0% first down rate per reception.
Yearby- 24 targets, 16 receptions. 66.7% catch rate. 164 yards for 6.8 yards/target. 10 first downs for a 62.5% first down rate per reception.
Walton- 22 targets, 19 receptions. 86.4% catch rate. 272 yards for 12.4 yards/target. 12 first downs for a 63.2% first down rate per reception.
Herndon- 23 targets, 16 receptions. 69.6% catch rate. 221 yards for 9.6 yards/target. 12 first downs for a 75.0% first down rate per reception.
A few things stand out here. First, Stacy Coley was one of only three players in the nation to have 50 targets, avg. 10+ air yards/target, catch 60%+ of his targets, and have zero drops. For a number one WR to have the production that he did is outstanding. A WR normally has ~60% catch rate, and 10 yards/target. Coley was above average all the way across the board and I look for a huge season out of his if he stays healthy.
Personally, I knew Mark Walton was a good pass catching back, but I didn’t realize he was quite this good. As a true freshman, he led our team in yards per target, as a RB! RB’s normally have around a 70% catch rate, 7 yards per target, and are generally not overly efficient since the defense often times wants the offense to check the ball down on long yardage situations and come up and make the tackle. A good OC schemes to get the ball in Walton’s hands out of the backfield this year.
Njoku had a horrendous game against Florida State, catching only 2 of his 7 targets for 33 yards, but otherwise was a good player last year. His efficiency numbers are pretty much average across the board, except he did have a nice yards per target for a TE. Herndon was the guy I was surprised with, and it is not a surprise that Richt came in and immediately singled him out as a guy who can do everything for the offense. I look for him to be featured a little more; especially on third downs, where he seems to excel. If Njoku does a better job catching the ball this year, and Herndon takes well to the H-back role, you will see a massive increase in efficiency for our offense. Yearby was average, and is not a bad pass catching back. Berrios I am prepared to give a pass because he wasn’t healthy, but he was not good last year. He had a few big rushing attempts at the end of the year that do not get factored in here, that if you made this metric simply “touches” he’d fare a little better. Dobard should be a blocker only, and used more like an extra OL.
Efficiency doesn’t end on the offensive end, so I wanted to look at our defensive efficiency and see how we fared there. In P5 games Miami defended against 115 standard drives (excluding kneel downs or end-of-half situations) and forced a punt on 45 of those drives. This is a 39.1% ratio of opponents drives. Average for this metric tends to be 49.3% among P5 teams. For instance, Florida State forced a punt on 60.3% of opponents drives. To be fair, I didn’t calculate out the drives against non-P5 teams, but even if you adjust this number down to account for this fact, Miami was far behind the truly excellent defenses in college football. This number feeds even more proof into the notion that Miami’s defense waited for the opponent to make a mistake, rather than being the aggressor.
Additionally, Miami forced a three and out on defense on only 24.3% of drives last year. Again, this is far behind the average of 34%. You can place a value on each yard on the field and the probability of points scored based on those yards. Last year, it was simply too easy to pick up first downs against Miami’s defense, and each percentage point this increases, the more percentage points Miami puts into their chances of winning games.
Penalties- We have all heard talk about the penalty issues we had last year. It is no secret that we need to improve greatly upon the penalty frequency and severity this season. I wanted to take a look at the overall impact we had during our P5 games last year.
Miami had 55 penalties on offense during P5 games, and there were 35 penalties on the defense during P5 games. Offensively, Miami was second in the entire nation with 33 false starts, and against P5 teams alone they had 24 false start penalties. A study was performed to gauge the impact penalties have on a teams’ points per drive metrics.
Among P5 teams, the average points per drive (PPP) is 2.25 offensively. If the offense has 1 flag during their drive, this number drops to 1.96 PPP (12.9% decrease). It drops to 1.66 PPP if the offense has 2 flags (15.3% decrease).
Among P5 teams, the average PPP is 1.66 defensively. If the defense has 1 flag during the drive, this rises to 2.74 PPP! Just simply having one penalty during a drive costs your team more than an entire point on the scoreboard on average. This is a 65.1% increase in points per drive by simply having one flag! If the defense has 2 flags, the PPP jumps to 3.96! That is more than a FG expected for every single drive the defense has a penalty. This means the Canes gave up an additional ~40 points last year simply due to the penalties they incurred. Astounding the impact that defensive penalties have on a team.
Here is a recap on players last year and the penalties they incurred during the 10 P5 games:
Team Penalties (Not attributed to one player)- 6 false starts, 1 Holding, 2 Illegal Blocks, 4 Illegal Formations, 2 Personal Fouls.
Alex Gall- 4 False Starts. Hold your water brother! Three of these occurred in the red zone with two on the one yard line.
Dobard- 1 False start, 2 Holding, 1 Unsportsmanlike Conduct
Darling- 3 False start, 2 Holding, 1 Illegal Block
Coley- 2 False start, 3 Unsportsmanlike Conduct
Njoku- 1 Pass Interference
Linder- 1 False start, 1 Holding
Herndon- 1 False start, 1 Pass Interference
McDermott- 1 False start, 2 Holding, 1 Illegal Block
Waters- 2 False start, 1 Illegal Block
Kaaya- 1 False start, 2 Delay of Game, 1 Int. Grounding
Odogwu- 1 False start
Cager- 1 Pass Interference
Scott- 1 False start, 1 Pass Interference
Coley needs to keep his emotions in check a little better. The unsportsmanlike conduct penalties are too many. Trevor Darling is a G, and is miscast as a LT. Dobard had some penalty issues for the snap percentage he plays. This can really improve with some work, and I like how Richt is acknowledging the problem. On a pure math level, they cost themselves ~25 points offensively last year.
Here is a recap on players last year and the penalties they incurred during the 10 P5 games:
Team Penalties- 3 Offsides, 1 Facemask, 4 Substitution, 1 Personal Foul, 1 Sideline
Norton- 1 Personal Foul
Bush- 1 Pass Interference, 1 Personal Foul
Carter- 1 Personal Foul
Crawford- 1 Offsides
Howard- 2 Pass Interference
Moten- 1 Roughing the Passer
Burns- 4 Pass Interference, 1 Personal Foul, 2 Unsportsmanlike, 1 Holding
Elder- 2 Pass Interference, 1 Personal Foul
Kamalu- 1 Facemask
Jenkins- 1 Personal Foul, 1 Unsportsmanlike
Thomas- 1 Roughing the Passer
Muhammad- 1 Roughing the Passer, 1 Personal Foul
For me, reading this is a referendum on our defense. It’s pretty astounding that we only had 2 facemask penalties in the 10 games. We only had 3 roughing the passer penalties in the games. On the flip side, we had 4 substitution penalties and a sideline penalty! We had 8 personal fouls, almost one every single game. I read this and say this is a passive scheme, with few aggressive penalties, and a team that is confused (substitution penalties), undisciplined (personal foul penalties and unsportsmanlike conducts and is a real reflection of the coaching staff that was in place.
This year, I would expect to see the offsides, roughing the passer, and facemask penalties go up. Aggressive teams that are trying to shoot gaps will be offsides some. Facemasks are just probabilities. Roughing the passer comes from a need to hit the QB in this offense. Hopefully they keep it in check, but I wouldn’t expect the overall number to rise much this year on the defensive side. I could even see the defense getting more aggressive while actually committing fewer penalties.
Looking at this team objectively, there is reason for optimism. An OL with much more experience than last year, an offensive playcaller who should be able to get more from his running game and create a higher success ratio, a coaching staff that requires aggressive play defensively will cause offenses to have to earn their first downs, and a coach who requires more discipline should reduce the number of penalties we incur this season. I didn’t mention it above, but Miami was also abysmal on special teams in the return games, so I expect that we will see a big improvement in that area as well.
Yards are points. The bend-but-don’t-break scheme is broken. A new air is upon us. Let us bask in the fresh air, and welcome that sweet siren song of hope into our hearts. It’s Canes season fellas, and I think it’s going to be a good one.
Success Rate- Success Rate is a measurement of how often each play was successful, as determined with the following guidelines:
• On first down, you gain at least 50% of the yardage required for a new set of downs.
• On second down, you gain at least 70% of the yardage required.
• On third or fourth down, a first down is gained.
It seems fairly intuitive that if you are performing well on each down and staying ahead of the down and distance you will perform well on offense, and vice versa on defense. Last year, Miami ranked 47th out of 65 teams in success rate for offense (40.30%) and 52nd out of 65 teams for defense (45.5%).
Miami truly struggled in all aspects of this metric last year, but I wanted to see if I could identify where the team really needs to improve to impact their success rate the most, and how to improve their points per drive, which was far below average last year. I charted the plays for Miami against other P5 schools, as I wanted to create a more level playing field of talent/resources, thus removing games against the FCS and group of 5 teams played against. The first area that stands out is that Miami was woeful in short yardage rushing last year. I define short yardage rushing as any rushing attempt when three yards or fewer are required. Last year, Miami was 19-46 in such situations against P5 teams on offense (41.3%). Elite teams generally convert in the 65% range, and average is somewhere around 55% of the time. Miami was truly one of the worst in the entire nation in this regard. Here is how our players stacked up in this area:
-Yearby: 7-20 (35.0%)
-Walton: 6-17 (35.3%)
-Tucker: 0-1 (he actually fumbled it and Odogwu recovered for a TD)
-Rosier: 1-1
-Kaaya: 4-6 (66.7%)
-Gray: 1-1
As you can see, truly both of our RB’s struggled in this area. In all games, Yearby converted at a 36.4%, so this isn’t a small sample fluke. Gus Edwards converted at a much higher clip the previous year, and adding a FB who can block will help in short yardage situations. To get to just average production, Miami will need to convert seven more of those 46 opportunities into first downs. That is seven more opportunities to score TD’s that they didn’t receive last year. Seven more scoring chances in 10 games is a significant increase in your chances of winning those games.
Coach Richt prefers to run a gap rushing offense on short yardage plays. A gap rushing attack is also known as a power rushing attack (as opposed to a zone blocking scheme). His go-to play on short yardage rushing attempts is the Power-O play. To run this play effectively you need to have a solid interior offensive line. It is man-on-man blocking for the LT, and then the LG is going to pull towards the RT to “kick out” the LB from the B gap (the B gap is the gap between the RG and the RT). The most important blocker in this play is the LG, since he is the puller (you can flip the play and have the RG pull to the opposite as well, but in my charting, Richt runs it most often with the LG), but the next most important is the C because he has to get the 3-technique DT so he doesn’t simply follow the LG’s hip to the ball carrier in the backfield. The FB or H-Back kicks out the end to the playside and then the RB follows the G through the hole and cuts off his backside (whichever defender in the hole doesn’t go). It’s a great play, and is highly successful, and has been highly successful for Richt in his career. More in-depth reading of the Power-O can be found here.
On the defensive side of the ball, we were truly a train wreck last year. Teams were successful on 32-46 attempts against us last year (exactly the same number of opportunities our offense had in these situations). That comes out to 69.6%, which was dead last among all 65 P5 teams. I mentioned that an elite offense generally converts these plays 65% of the time, well the Miami defense was turning every team they played into an elite offense in these situations. We have all discussed the defensive scheme and its shortcomings ad nauseum, but this was truly the biggest drawback to the read and react soft base defense we ran last year. It was far too easy for our opponents to keep drives going by rushing the football. Manny Diaz defenses look to solve this problem by applying pressure in short yardage situations. By moving the DT’s into the A gaps, this provides resistance for the easiest way to convert short yardage rushing situations. Last year, our DT’s were responsible for both the A & B gaps, causing them to control the OL first, then move to make the tackle. It is very difficult to stop a run for a yard or less playing this technique as a defensive lineman. That means a LB has to fill the gap quickly, but also maintain integrity for their passing assignments. When you hear our players talking about having to “think” too much in the old scheme, this is where it hurt them in this situation. This new defense will be susceptible to “trap” plays, which allow the DL to get upfield, only to be blocked by a puller or a backside OL, but the play takes an extra second to run, providing more time for the other DL and perhaps LB’ers to get into the play. The new scheme will allow some runs to “pop” when the DL gets upfield and the OL can get to the second level, but I expect that success ratio above to improve dramatically (honestly, I believe this number will improve as much as any team in the country does next year). Stopping this play is the foundation for any successful defense, and has been job number one since Diaz and Kuligowski arrived on campus.
After the short yardage rushing conversion has been addressed, the next part of dramatically improving the success ratio of the team is to improve in the mid-yardage areas. Too often last year, Miami was faced with 3rd and long situations, which the team fared pretty well in, honestly. A lot of that goes to the playmaking ability of Brad Kaaya and the receivers. Coach Richt has an offense that is built to absolutely exploit this area, and allow an offense to stay on track with first downs. By now, we all are familiar with one of the staples of a Coach Richt passing offense; the shallow cross concept. To run this concept to its fullest capabilities, you need to have a shifty slot WR who is tough and can hold onto the ball, and then you need to have an athletic TE who is able to create yards after catch. To the far side, you want a big-play WR threat to keep a S occupied in most situations. To the boundary you want a versatile WR who can run just about route effectively. If it feels like Miami has the personnel to excel in this scheme, it’s because they do. Braxton Berrios is a perfect fit as the slot WR for the one actually running the shallow cross about two yards passed the LOS. David Njoku was born to run the option route for this offense. He will line up to the outside of the slot and run straight up field. The reason it’s nice to have a TE fill this spot is he will often be asked to block on the play when they throw it to the shallow crosser. When it doesn’t go to the crosser, Njoku will have the “option” of running a comeback route, designed to get 6-8 yards, or run an option off the outside shoulder of the defender if he tries to come up on the comeback route. Njoku’s size, frame, athleticism, and blocking ability makes his tailor made for this role. Stacy Coley is the versatile WR who can run any route. Ahmmon Richards is the deep threat to the backside in case the field CB decides to start peeking, or the FS doesn’t stay home in deep territory or tries to double Coley. This play is not designed to be a big play, so most often the target isn’t to the far WR, but it’s important to have that threat to keep the defense honest and allow the offense to keep getting those 5-10 yard plays consistently. This concept combined with the expected improvement in short rushing performance allows for Miami to expect a huge jump in success rate this upcoming season.
Success rate has the highest correlation to winning of any metric in football. With an r^2 above .70, it is statistically significant as well.
On the defensive side of the ball, this is where Diaz’ defense is most vulnerable. I expect Diaz defense to dramatically improve the number of sacks and tackles for losses our team achieves next year, and the fact that our corners will press a ton more will prevent a lot of those bubble screens and the QB standing up and throwing the ball to a WR with a CB 10yards off of him for easy yardage. This defense does have a hole in it though, and it is in the middle of the field where six to eight yard completions are achieved at a higher rate than the national average. This means that a lot of 2nd and 12’s become 3rd and 3’s in this defense. When these plays are incomplete is when the pressure can really be let loose on 3rd down and stops are made, but be prepared for a higher percentage of the 2nd and 3rd and longs to be converted than you’d like to see. It’s just the trade-off for the aggression that this defense will seek.
I still expect the success rate for the defense to improve dramatically based on the short yardage rushing defense improving and the sacks and tackles for losses taking a step forward.
For the offense to get to average, they will need to convert 27 more successful plays than last year (320 to 347). To make top-20, they will need to convert 42 more (44.4%). To make the top-10, they would need to convert 70 more plays. To get to the top spot they would need to convert 101 more plays successfully (51.7%).
Rushing Rate- This isn’t meant to simply look at the percentage of times Miami rushed the ball, but rather what an expected amount of rushing attempts would take place given the circumstances on the field and the projected success in those situations. Keep in mind I’ve already discussed above that Miami fared extremely poorly in short yardage rushing situations, but it also should be noted that Miami passed the ball in situations where rushing the ball would have higher odds of success. Their adjusted rushing rate of 46.3% falls in the 21st percentile nationally and shows that the playcalling really impacted our ability to sustain drives and score points last year. Conversely, Georgia had an adjusted rushing rate of 55.8%, showing that Richt is perfectly content with using his running game to setup favorable down and distance situations. Add to it that Richt should operate a much faster pace than Miami employed last year (or Georgia, for that matter) and you can see how the playcalling will open opportunities that were not present last year.
My research and the advanced metrics show that Coley was overmatched at a playcaller at this level. I do not believe that will be the case with Coach Richt based on metrics achieved during his time calling plays at Georgia.
Efficiency- Miami loses 142 targets from games against P5 schools. Here are the results of those targets:
Waters- 48 targets, 32 receptions. 66.7% catch rate. 501 yards for 10.4 yards/target. 17 first downs for a 53.1% first down rate per reception.
Scott- 61 targets, 40 receptions. 65.6% catch rate. 500 yards for 8.2 yards/target. 25 first downs for a 62.5% first down rate per reception.
Brady- 18 targets, 10 receptions. 55.6% catch rate. 123 yards for 6.8 yards/target. 6 first downs for a 60.0% first down rate per reception.
Cager- 15 targets, 8 receptions. 53.3% catch rate, 70 yards for 4.7 yards/target. 4 first downs for a 50.0% first down rate per reception.
Losing Herb Waters will hurt our offense, as his yards per target were quite good at 10.4. Rashawn Scott filled the role of a possession WR quite well, but was not dynamic on an efficiency level. Cager and Brady were bad in their efficiency numbers and are really not huge losses. It’s important to note role when analyzing efficiency numbers, as a slot WR will invariably have lower yards per target but should have a higher first down percentage.
Here is how the returning players fared last year:
Coley- 53 targets, 37 receptions. 69.8% catch rate. 624 yards for 11.8 yards/target. 24 first downs for a 64.9% first down rate per reception.
Berrios- 14 targets, 10 receptions. 71.4% catch rate. 73 yards for 5.2 yards/target. 3 first downs for a 30.0% first down rate per reception.
Njoku- 34 targets, 20 receptions. 58.8% catch rate. 347 yards for 10.2 yards/target. 12 first downs for a 60.0% first down rate per reception.
Dobard- 11 targets, 4 receptions. 36.4% catch rate. 51 yards for 4.6 yards/target. 2 first downs for a 50.0% first down rate per reception.
Yearby- 24 targets, 16 receptions. 66.7% catch rate. 164 yards for 6.8 yards/target. 10 first downs for a 62.5% first down rate per reception.
Walton- 22 targets, 19 receptions. 86.4% catch rate. 272 yards for 12.4 yards/target. 12 first downs for a 63.2% first down rate per reception.
Herndon- 23 targets, 16 receptions. 69.6% catch rate. 221 yards for 9.6 yards/target. 12 first downs for a 75.0% first down rate per reception.
A few things stand out here. First, Stacy Coley was one of only three players in the nation to have 50 targets, avg. 10+ air yards/target, catch 60%+ of his targets, and have zero drops. For a number one WR to have the production that he did is outstanding. A WR normally has ~60% catch rate, and 10 yards/target. Coley was above average all the way across the board and I look for a huge season out of his if he stays healthy.
Personally, I knew Mark Walton was a good pass catching back, but I didn’t realize he was quite this good. As a true freshman, he led our team in yards per target, as a RB! RB’s normally have around a 70% catch rate, 7 yards per target, and are generally not overly efficient since the defense often times wants the offense to check the ball down on long yardage situations and come up and make the tackle. A good OC schemes to get the ball in Walton’s hands out of the backfield this year.
Njoku had a horrendous game against Florida State, catching only 2 of his 7 targets for 33 yards, but otherwise was a good player last year. His efficiency numbers are pretty much average across the board, except he did have a nice yards per target for a TE. Herndon was the guy I was surprised with, and it is not a surprise that Richt came in and immediately singled him out as a guy who can do everything for the offense. I look for him to be featured a little more; especially on third downs, where he seems to excel. If Njoku does a better job catching the ball this year, and Herndon takes well to the H-back role, you will see a massive increase in efficiency for our offense. Yearby was average, and is not a bad pass catching back. Berrios I am prepared to give a pass because he wasn’t healthy, but he was not good last year. He had a few big rushing attempts at the end of the year that do not get factored in here, that if you made this metric simply “touches” he’d fare a little better. Dobard should be a blocker only, and used more like an extra OL.
Efficiency doesn’t end on the offensive end, so I wanted to look at our defensive efficiency and see how we fared there. In P5 games Miami defended against 115 standard drives (excluding kneel downs or end-of-half situations) and forced a punt on 45 of those drives. This is a 39.1% ratio of opponents drives. Average for this metric tends to be 49.3% among P5 teams. For instance, Florida State forced a punt on 60.3% of opponents drives. To be fair, I didn’t calculate out the drives against non-P5 teams, but even if you adjust this number down to account for this fact, Miami was far behind the truly excellent defenses in college football. This number feeds even more proof into the notion that Miami’s defense waited for the opponent to make a mistake, rather than being the aggressor.
Additionally, Miami forced a three and out on defense on only 24.3% of drives last year. Again, this is far behind the average of 34%. You can place a value on each yard on the field and the probability of points scored based on those yards. Last year, it was simply too easy to pick up first downs against Miami’s defense, and each percentage point this increases, the more percentage points Miami puts into their chances of winning games.
Penalties- We have all heard talk about the penalty issues we had last year. It is no secret that we need to improve greatly upon the penalty frequency and severity this season. I wanted to take a look at the overall impact we had during our P5 games last year.
Miami had 55 penalties on offense during P5 games, and there were 35 penalties on the defense during P5 games. Offensively, Miami was second in the entire nation with 33 false starts, and against P5 teams alone they had 24 false start penalties. A study was performed to gauge the impact penalties have on a teams’ points per drive metrics.
Among P5 teams, the average points per drive (PPP) is 2.25 offensively. If the offense has 1 flag during their drive, this number drops to 1.96 PPP (12.9% decrease). It drops to 1.66 PPP if the offense has 2 flags (15.3% decrease).
Among P5 teams, the average PPP is 1.66 defensively. If the defense has 1 flag during the drive, this rises to 2.74 PPP! Just simply having one penalty during a drive costs your team more than an entire point on the scoreboard on average. This is a 65.1% increase in points per drive by simply having one flag! If the defense has 2 flags, the PPP jumps to 3.96! That is more than a FG expected for every single drive the defense has a penalty. This means the Canes gave up an additional ~40 points last year simply due to the penalties they incurred. Astounding the impact that defensive penalties have on a team.
Here is a recap on players last year and the penalties they incurred during the 10 P5 games:
Team Penalties (Not attributed to one player)- 6 false starts, 1 Holding, 2 Illegal Blocks, 4 Illegal Formations, 2 Personal Fouls.
Alex Gall- 4 False Starts. Hold your water brother! Three of these occurred in the red zone with two on the one yard line.
Dobard- 1 False start, 2 Holding, 1 Unsportsmanlike Conduct
Darling- 3 False start, 2 Holding, 1 Illegal Block
Coley- 2 False start, 3 Unsportsmanlike Conduct
Njoku- 1 Pass Interference
Linder- 1 False start, 1 Holding
Herndon- 1 False start, 1 Pass Interference
McDermott- 1 False start, 2 Holding, 1 Illegal Block
Waters- 2 False start, 1 Illegal Block
Kaaya- 1 False start, 2 Delay of Game, 1 Int. Grounding
Odogwu- 1 False start
Cager- 1 Pass Interference
Scott- 1 False start, 1 Pass Interference
Coley needs to keep his emotions in check a little better. The unsportsmanlike conduct penalties are too many. Trevor Darling is a G, and is miscast as a LT. Dobard had some penalty issues for the snap percentage he plays. This can really improve with some work, and I like how Richt is acknowledging the problem. On a pure math level, they cost themselves ~25 points offensively last year.
Here is a recap on players last year and the penalties they incurred during the 10 P5 games:
Team Penalties- 3 Offsides, 1 Facemask, 4 Substitution, 1 Personal Foul, 1 Sideline
Norton- 1 Personal Foul
Bush- 1 Pass Interference, 1 Personal Foul
Carter- 1 Personal Foul
Crawford- 1 Offsides
Howard- 2 Pass Interference
Moten- 1 Roughing the Passer
Burns- 4 Pass Interference, 1 Personal Foul, 2 Unsportsmanlike, 1 Holding
Elder- 2 Pass Interference, 1 Personal Foul
Kamalu- 1 Facemask
Jenkins- 1 Personal Foul, 1 Unsportsmanlike
Thomas- 1 Roughing the Passer
Muhammad- 1 Roughing the Passer, 1 Personal Foul
For me, reading this is a referendum on our defense. It’s pretty astounding that we only had 2 facemask penalties in the 10 games. We only had 3 roughing the passer penalties in the games. On the flip side, we had 4 substitution penalties and a sideline penalty! We had 8 personal fouls, almost one every single game. I read this and say this is a passive scheme, with few aggressive penalties, and a team that is confused (substitution penalties), undisciplined (personal foul penalties and unsportsmanlike conducts and is a real reflection of the coaching staff that was in place.
This year, I would expect to see the offsides, roughing the passer, and facemask penalties go up. Aggressive teams that are trying to shoot gaps will be offsides some. Facemasks are just probabilities. Roughing the passer comes from a need to hit the QB in this offense. Hopefully they keep it in check, but I wouldn’t expect the overall number to rise much this year on the defensive side. I could even see the defense getting more aggressive while actually committing fewer penalties.
Looking at this team objectively, there is reason for optimism. An OL with much more experience than last year, an offensive playcaller who should be able to get more from his running game and create a higher success ratio, a coaching staff that requires aggressive play defensively will cause offenses to have to earn their first downs, and a coach who requires more discipline should reduce the number of penalties we incur this season. I didn’t mention it above, but Miami was also abysmal on special teams in the return games, so I expect that we will see a big improvement in that area as well.
Yards are points. The bend-but-don’t-break scheme is broken. A new air is upon us. Let us bask in the fresh air, and welcome that sweet siren song of hope into our hearts. It’s Canes season fellas, and I think it’s going to be a good one.
