Do We Have a Top-Flight Analytics Depart.?

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This would truly be my dream to be an analyst for a college sports department. I have a background in risk analysis and data analytics (which is just a fancy term for what is essentially "big data").

This part was something that jumped out to me and I'd want to do further research into:

And because the opponent changes every week, the percentages do as well. A scenario that produced a kick recommendation one week because the opponent was a strong, high-scoring team that plays up-tempo could change the next week when possessions are at a premium against a low-scoring underdog.

You wouldn't want to be kicking FG's (in my mind) against a high scoring up-tempo team. That would be a scenario where you would want to be going for it more often due to the reduction in risk (since you have more opportunities it's lower risk) and an increase in reward (the extra four points gain marginal value when the overall points total rises. As the increase to win expectancy with seven points is exponentially higher than it is with three points in a high scoring game).

In truth, from a mathematical sense, you should really be going for it much more often on fourth down because the expected value of the play is higher to go than it for a FG in many cases. Keep in mind, FG's are not 100%, so it is not a "guaranteed" three points.

So why do coaches not go for it more often on fourth down? Because they want to keep their jobs, and going for it on fourth down and not getting it is more high profile than punting it and the other team scoring, or kicking a FG etc.

You can split the field into Expected Points for each yardage on the field, and then do the math from there on how many points you are adding by each yardage etc. and then come up with the highest expected point total from each decision along the way. The link seems to reference more of a "game situation" guide, rather than any true model of mathematical decision making.

Clock management is another area where coaches tend to fall woefully short in their performance. I'd have an analyst on staff who specializes strictly in this area of the game.

I'd love to see more analytics used in the evaluations of recruits. Too often we look at height/weight/speed/arm strength etc. and do not understand that players who tend to perform well at the high school level tend to perform well at the college level. 95% of above average QB's in college were above average in HS. In fact, all multiple year starting QB's in the NFL were above average in the areas of completion percentage, TD/Interception ratio, Yards per Attempt, of all high school QB's coming out.

Every pro QB who made the Pro Bowl since 2007 was at least in the 84th percentile coming out of high school.

For reference, Jarren Williams was 69th percentile of all QB's since 2007. N'Kosi Perry was 84th percentile.
 
A High School team in my home state has an autistic student who is a mathematical savant that does there analytics and they have been pretty successful with it.
 
Show me 5 recent examples of real success in major college or pro sports that went heavy into analytics/"Moneyball" and I'll show you 50 more examples that didn't.

I'm not saying to rebuff math and science but this stuff gets wayyyyyyy more credit than actual results. I blame Jonah Hill and Brad Pitt.
 
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I think analytics are part of a successful program,not the foundation mind you but part of preparation .
Would imagine schools who spend money Bama, OSU, UGA, have a portion of budget that covers this type of preparation .
nowadays there is so much film available on kids that you can get the percentile of the 2 QB's on our roster
 
Show me 5 recent examples of real success in major college or pro sports that went heavy into analytics/"Moneyball" and I'll show you 50 more examples that didn't.

I'm not saying to rebuff math and science but this stuff gets wayyyyyyy more credit than actual results. I blame Jonah Hill and Brad Pitt.

There has to be balance. Analytics are guides and suggestions. They can be extremely critical in gathering fatigue and recovery information for example in football, but its how you use that data efficiently.


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Show me 5 recent examples of real success in major college or pro sports that went heavy into analytics/"Moneyball" and I'll show you 50 more examples that didn't.

I'm not saying to rebuff math and science but this stuff gets wayyyyyyy more credit than actual results. I blame Jonah Hill and Brad Pitt.

I believe all the NFL uses it to some extent. The coaches use charts to know when to go for a 2 pt conversion over just kicking the extra point. Especially with the increased distance. Jimmy Johnson introduced giving draft picks a weight scale when it came to trading.
 
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Quick! Someone run over to the math club and hire every single one of them...
 
It's mind boggling how bad NFL and College coaches are at understanding when to go for it on fourth down. The coaches that get it have such an advantage during these game situations. One of my biggest issues with Richt is that he doesn't get it. The most recent example was sending Badgley out to kick a 50 plus field goal last game. All year he has settled for 3 points when it was fourth and short. I hope this has to do with his lack of confidence with the offense and how bad we were in short down situations. If he doesn't get it, we need an analytics guy who helps him get it.
 
Show me 5 recent examples of real success in major college or pro sports that went heavy into analytics/"Moneyball" and I'll show you 50 more examples that didn't.

I'm not saying to rebuff math and science but this stuff gets wayyyyyyy more credit than actual results. I blame Jonah Hill and Brad Pitt.

There has to be balance. Analytics are guides and suggestions. They can be extremely critical in gathering fatigue and recovery information for example in football, but its how you use that data efficiently.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

For sure. I'm just against those that go all in on it. Those guys have already tried to ruin baseball and have failed more than they've succeeded.

I'm absolutely not opposed to it in training techniques and even in general game strategizing. I think where you rightfully lose a lot of people is when some of these guys go so data intense that they start to remove the actual human element from high pressure situations and believe that things like intangibles and being "clutch" are illusions. It's one of the things I find most infuriating about Lebatard and his rants on this.
 
This would truly be my dream to be an analyst for a college sports department. I have a background in risk analysis and data analytics (which is just a fancy term for what is essentially "big data").

This part was something that jumped out to me and I'd want to do further research into:

And because the opponent changes every week, the percentages do as well. A scenario that produced a kick recommendation one week because the opponent was a strong, high-scoring team that plays up-tempo could change the next week when possessions are at a premium against a low-scoring underdog.

You wouldn't want to be kicking FG's (in my mind) against a high scoring up-tempo team. That would be a scenario where you would want to be going for it more often due to the reduction in risk (since you have more opportunities it's lower risk) and an increase in reward (the extra four points gain marginal value when the overall points total rises. As the increase to win expectancy with seven points is exponentially higher than it is with three points in a high scoring game).

In truth, from a mathematical sense, you should really be going for it much more often on fourth down because the expected value of the play is higher to go than it for a FG in many cases. Keep in mind, FG's are not 100%, so it is not a "guaranteed" three points.

So why do coaches not go for it more often on fourth down? Because they want to keep their jobs, and going for it on fourth down and not getting it is more high profile than punting it and the other team scoring, or kicking a FG etc.

You can split the field into Expected Points for each yardage on the field, and then do the math from there on how many points you are adding by each yardage etc. and then come up with the highest expected point total from each decision along the way. The link seems to reference more of a "game situation" guide, rather than any true model of mathematical decision making.

Clock management is another area where coaches tend to fall woefully short in their performance. I'd have an analyst on staff who specializes strictly in this area of the game.

I'd love to see more analytics used in the evaluations of recruits. Too often we look at height/weight/speed/arm strength etc. and do not understand that players who tend to perform well at the high school level tend to perform well at the college level. 95% of above average QB's in college were above average in HS. In fact, all multiple year starting QB's in the NFL were above average in the areas of completion percentage, TD/Interception ratio, Yards per Attempt, of all high school QB's coming out.

Every pro QB who made the Pro Bowl since 2007 was at least in the 84th percentile coming out of high school.

For reference, Jarren Williams was 69th percentile of all QB's since 2007. N'Kosi Perry was 84th percentile.

I’d hire you.
 
It's mind boggling how bad NFL and College coaches are at understanding when to go for it on fourth down. The coaches that get it have such an advantage during these game situations. One of my biggest issues with Richt is that he doesn't get it. The mosrecent example was sending Badgley out to kick a 50 plus field goal last game. All year he has settled for 3 points when it was fourth and short. I hope this has to do with his lack of confidence with the offense and how bad we were in short down situations. If he doesn't get it, we need an analytics guy who helps him get it.
No.its probably he felt he did not have the back,RB or QB who could make that fourth down nearly 90%of the time.Lingard
behind George eventually,different story!
 
This would truly be my dream to be an analyst for a college sports department. I have a background in risk analysis and data analytics (which is just a fancy term for what is essentially "big data").

This part was something that jumped out to me and I'd want to do further research into:

And because the opponent changes every week, the percentages do as well. A scenario that produced a kick recommendation one week because the opponent was a strong, high-scoring team that plays up-tempo could change the next week when possessions are at a premium against a low-scoring underdog.

You wouldn't want to be kicking FG's (in my mind) against a high scoring up-tempo team. That would be a scenario where you would want to be going for it more often due to the reduction in risk (since you have more opportunities it's lower risk) and an increase in reward (the extra four points gain marginal value when the overall points total rises. As the increase to win expectancy with seven points is exponentially higher than it is with three points in a high scoring game).

In truth, from a mathematical sense, you should really be going for it much more often on fourth down because the expected value of the play is higher to go than it for a FG in many cases. Keep in mind, FG's are not 100%, so it is not a "guaranteed" three points.

So why do coaches not go for it more often on fourth down? Because they want to keep their jobs, and going for it on fourth down and not getting it is more high profile than punting it and the other team scoring, or kicking a FG etc.

You can split the field into Expected Points for each yardage on the field, and then do the math from there on how many points you are adding by each yardage etc. and then come up with the highest expected point total from each decision along the way. The link seems to reference more of a "game situation" guide, rather than any true model of mathematical decision making.

Clock management is another area where coaches tend to fall woefully short in their performance. I'd have an analyst on staff who specializes strictly in this area of the game.

I'd love to see more analytics used in the evaluations of recruits. Too often we look at height/weight/speed/arm strength etc. and do not understand that players who tend to perform well at the high school level tend to perform well at the college level. 95% of above average QB's in college were above average in HS. In fact, all multiple year starting QB's in the NFL were above average in the areas of completion percentage, TD/Interception ratio, Yards per Attempt, of all high school QB's coming out.

Every pro QB who made the Pro Bowl since 2007 was at least in the 84th percentile coming out of high school.

For reference, Jarren Williams was 69th percentile of all QB's since 2007. N'Kosi Perry was 84th percentile.

I’d hire you.

Same here... report to Greentree in the morning.

Meanwhile figure out what were the chances of DBC eating his sandwich before the bear got him.
 
It's mind boggling how bad NFL and College coaches are at understanding when to go for it on fourth down. The coaches that get it have such an advantage during these game situations. One of my biggest issues with Richt is that he doesn't get it. The most recent example was sending Badgley out to kick a 50 plus field goal last game. All year he has settled for 3 points when it was fourth and short. I hope this has to do with his lack of confidence with the offense and how bad we were in short down situations. If he doesn't get it, we need an analytics guy who helps him get it.

Yeah, but the other side of the coin is that Badgely was supposed to have the leg to make that kick.

In the Rose Bowl on Monday Kirby Smart sent his former walk-on kicker out to try a 55 yarder right before halftime instead of trying a Flutie-Dootie. The dude hit the FG. How important was that when you look at how the game turned out?

Analytics work better AFTER the game is over.
 
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It's mind boggling how bad NFL and College coaches are at understanding when to go for it on fourth down. The coaches that get it have such an advantage during these game situations. One of my biggest issues with Richt is that he doesn't get it. The most recent example was sending Badgley out to kick a 50 plus field goal last game. All year he has settled for 3 points when it was fourth and short. I hope this has to do with his lack of confidence with the offense and how bad we were in short down situations. If he doesn't get it, we need an analytics guy who helps him get it.

Yeah, but the other side of the coin is that Badgely was supposed to have the leg to make that kick.

In the Rose Bowl on Monday Kirby Smart sent his former walk-on kicker out to try a 55 yarder right before halftime instead of trying a Flutie-Dootie. The dude hit the FG. How important was that when you look at how the game turned out?

Analytics work better AFTER the game is over.

You don't need to crunch numbers to know when it makes sense to go for it or not. I don't play hindsight. I was screaming to go for it before badgley was short and way to the right. Multiple times this year I've been screaming to go for it and even after Badgley makes it I still think it's the wrong decision. Your example of Georgia kicking a FG is irrelevant. Of course you try to kick a long fg with no time on the clock and pick up 3 because you have a better chance of making that than a 45 yard hail mary.

College football has a ton of scoring so you need touchdowns to win. Sure situationally field goals are helpful. But a lot of times you have college coaches electing to kick a field goal on fourth and 3 or less and are relying on a college kicker to hit a 45 plus yarder on a wide hash mark. And the best case scenario is 3 points when typically you need more. So who do you trust more, your offense or your field goal kicker from those distances?
 
Not to mention, when you have the mindset of going for it on fourth down in the other team's territory it's much easier to get first downs. On 3rd and 5 you can now hand it off to pick up a couple of yards and set the team up better for a fourth down conversion. When teams are averaging 30 plus a game and the rules are designed to benefit the offense, field goals typically don't cut it.
 
Pro teams are just starting to get a grasp on how to quantify analytics in football. Its not as cut and dry as baseball, basketball, or hockey. Its not a series of events like baseball or situational like basketball or hockey...football is more chess like with a lot of individual parts that don't necessarily have a value attached to what they are doing, but more teams and more people outside of the sport are trying to quantify the sport. It is making evaluation of players pre-draft more interesting...re: what works, what testing is important, why is it important, what production are you looking for. Evaluation is less holistic and eye-testy for a lot of teams now (Seattle is the best example recently, but not the only one).

It'll eventually filter to college, but I'd attempt to be really out in front on this, but it would require a lot of money invested in a support staff with innovative minds to do so...and unfortunately, I don't think Miami will ever invest in this early. They might be reactive instead of proactive...after seeing someone else succeed...but this is something I'd be all in on right now, especially for recruiting purposes. It'd help Miami narrow its focus on players. Take that Alabama/Georgia infrastructure we've been talking about and instead of using it as some sort of relationship building unit, you use that infrastructure as an evaluation and risk management unit.

You can bring this to the field, too, but because football in general is such an old boys network, its much tougher to bring this to the actual Xs and Os portion of the game. Although, you have seen it a little bit more with some of the non-old boys and the up tempo offenses with volume of play guys, etc.
 
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