Earnest T. Bass
Sophomore
- Joined
- Dec 14, 2016
- Messages
- 2,073
And because the opponent changes every week, the percentages do as well. A scenario that produced a kick recommendation one week because the opponent was a strong, high-scoring team that plays up-tempo could change the next week when possessions are at a premium against a low-scoring underdog.
Show me 5 recent examples of real success in major college or pro sports that went heavy into analytics/"Moneyball" and I'll show you 50 more examples that didn't.
I'm not saying to rebuff math and science but this stuff gets wayyyyyyy more credit than actual results. I blame Jonah Hill and Brad Pitt.
Show me 5 recent examples of real success in major college or pro sports that went heavy into analytics/"Moneyball" and I'll show you 50 more examples that didn't.
I'm not saying to rebuff math and science but this stuff gets wayyyyyyy more credit than actual results. I blame Jonah Hill and Brad Pitt.
Show me 5 recent examples of real success in major college or pro sports that went heavy into analytics/"Moneyball" and I'll show you 50 more examples that didn't.
I'm not saying to rebuff math and science but this stuff gets wayyyyyyy more credit than actual results. I blame Jonah Hill and Brad Pitt.
There has to be balance. Analytics are guides and suggestions. They can be extremely critical in gathering fatigue and recovery information for example in football, but its how you use that data efficiently.
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This would truly be my dream to be an analyst for a college sports department. I have a background in risk analysis and data analytics (which is just a fancy term for what is essentially "big data").
This part was something that jumped out to me and I'd want to do further research into:
And because the opponent changes every week, the percentages do as well. A scenario that produced a kick recommendation one week because the opponent was a strong, high-scoring team that plays up-tempo could change the next week when possessions are at a premium against a low-scoring underdog.
You wouldn't want to be kicking FG's (in my mind) against a high scoring up-tempo team. That would be a scenario where you would want to be going for it more often due to the reduction in risk (since you have more opportunities it's lower risk) and an increase in reward (the extra four points gain marginal value when the overall points total rises. As the increase to win expectancy with seven points is exponentially higher than it is with three points in a high scoring game).
In truth, from a mathematical sense, you should really be going for it much more often on fourth down because the expected value of the play is higher to go than it for a FG in many cases. Keep in mind, FG's are not 100%, so it is not a "guaranteed" three points.
So why do coaches not go for it more often on fourth down? Because they want to keep their jobs, and going for it on fourth down and not getting it is more high profile than punting it and the other team scoring, or kicking a FG etc.
You can split the field into Expected Points for each yardage on the field, and then do the math from there on how many points you are adding by each yardage etc. and then come up with the highest expected point total from each decision along the way. The link seems to reference more of a "game situation" guide, rather than any true model of mathematical decision making.
Clock management is another area where coaches tend to fall woefully short in their performance. I'd have an analyst on staff who specializes strictly in this area of the game.
I'd love to see more analytics used in the evaluations of recruits. Too often we look at height/weight/speed/arm strength etc. and do not understand that players who tend to perform well at the high school level tend to perform well at the college level. 95% of above average QB's in college were above average in HS. In fact, all multiple year starting QB's in the NFL were above average in the areas of completion percentage, TD/Interception ratio, Yards per Attempt, of all high school QB's coming out.
Every pro QB who made the Pro Bowl since 2007 was at least in the 84th percentile coming out of high school.
For reference, Jarren Williams was 69th percentile of all QB's since 2007. N'Kosi Perry was 84th percentile.
No.its probably he felt he did not have the back,RB or QB who could make that fourth down nearly 90%of the time.LingardIt's mind boggling how bad NFL and College coaches are at understanding when to go for it on fourth down. The coaches that get it have such an advantage during these game situations. One of my biggest issues with Richt is that he doesn't get it. The mosrecent example was sending Badgley out to kick a 50 plus field goal last game. All year he has settled for 3 points when it was fourth and short. I hope this has to do with his lack of confidence with the offense and how bad we were in short down situations. If he doesn't get it, we need an analytics guy who helps him get it.
This would truly be my dream to be an analyst for a college sports department. I have a background in risk analysis and data analytics (which is just a fancy term for what is essentially "big data").
This part was something that jumped out to me and I'd want to do further research into:
And because the opponent changes every week, the percentages do as well. A scenario that produced a kick recommendation one week because the opponent was a strong, high-scoring team that plays up-tempo could change the next week when possessions are at a premium against a low-scoring underdog.
You wouldn't want to be kicking FG's (in my mind) against a high scoring up-tempo team. That would be a scenario where you would want to be going for it more often due to the reduction in risk (since you have more opportunities it's lower risk) and an increase in reward (the extra four points gain marginal value when the overall points total rises. As the increase to win expectancy with seven points is exponentially higher than it is with three points in a high scoring game).
In truth, from a mathematical sense, you should really be going for it much more often on fourth down because the expected value of the play is higher to go than it for a FG in many cases. Keep in mind, FG's are not 100%, so it is not a "guaranteed" three points.
So why do coaches not go for it more often on fourth down? Because they want to keep their jobs, and going for it on fourth down and not getting it is more high profile than punting it and the other team scoring, or kicking a FG etc.
You can split the field into Expected Points for each yardage on the field, and then do the math from there on how many points you are adding by each yardage etc. and then come up with the highest expected point total from each decision along the way. The link seems to reference more of a "game situation" guide, rather than any true model of mathematical decision making.
Clock management is another area where coaches tend to fall woefully short in their performance. I'd have an analyst on staff who specializes strictly in this area of the game.
I'd love to see more analytics used in the evaluations of recruits. Too often we look at height/weight/speed/arm strength etc. and do not understand that players who tend to perform well at the high school level tend to perform well at the college level. 95% of above average QB's in college were above average in HS. In fact, all multiple year starting QB's in the NFL were above average in the areas of completion percentage, TD/Interception ratio, Yards per Attempt, of all high school QB's coming out.
Every pro QB who made the Pro Bowl since 2007 was at least in the 84th percentile coming out of high school.
For reference, Jarren Williams was 69th percentile of all QB's since 2007. N'Kosi Perry was 84th percentile.
I’d hire you.
It's mind boggling how bad NFL and College coaches are at understanding when to go for it on fourth down. The coaches that get it have such an advantage during these game situations. One of my biggest issues with Richt is that he doesn't get it. The most recent example was sending Badgley out to kick a 50 plus field goal last game. All year he has settled for 3 points when it was fourth and short. I hope this has to do with his lack of confidence with the offense and how bad we were in short down situations. If he doesn't get it, we need an analytics guy who helps him get it.
It's mind boggling how bad NFL and College coaches are at understanding when to go for it on fourth down. The coaches that get it have such an advantage during these game situations. One of my biggest issues with Richt is that he doesn't get it. The most recent example was sending Badgley out to kick a 50 plus field goal last game. All year he has settled for 3 points when it was fourth and short. I hope this has to do with his lack of confidence with the offense and how bad we were in short down situations. If he doesn't get it, we need an analytics guy who helps him get it.
Yeah, but the other side of the coin is that Badgely was supposed to have the leg to make that kick.
In the Rose Bowl on Monday Kirby Smart sent his former walk-on kicker out to try a 55 yarder right before halftime instead of trying a Flutie-Dootie. The dude hit the FG. How important was that when you look at how the game turned out?
Analytics work better AFTER the game is over.