Coach Macho Breaks Down Coach Hetherman's Defense: Apex Defenders, Cover 3, and the Blitz Numbers That Actually Hurt Miami
15 min read
DMoney: We always talk about Coach Hetherman's defense and its signatures, but what do we actually know about what that means — the features, the terminology? Let's dive deep and take our understanding of this defense to the next level. Next Level Development Defensive Consulting CEO, defensive coordinator at MacArthur, big-time Canes fan, and one of our more requested guests — Coach Macho.
Coach Macho: Great day to be a Cane, baby.
DMoney: Coach Hetherman's defense last year — a defense that was arguably the reason Miami missed the playoffs in 2024 — gets a personnel boost, guys come back in different roles, and suddenly you've got a top-five defense in the country, arguably the best in the country given the level of competition faced in the playoffs, especially up front. If someone mentioned Hetherman's defense among football people, not fans, what's the signature that stands out?
Coach Macho: High pressure usage and single-high coverage — closed-post coverage. Heavy dominance in Cover 3, and heavy blitz usage.
Coach Macho: In a Cover 3 scheme, you're always going to have one safety down — for Miami, that's Thomas at boundary safety, rolled down a lot. From an offensive standpoint, you just see Cover 3. You don't know if Scott's blitzing or Thomas is blitzing, because they're always lined up as what we call apex defenders — the guy who sets the edge, essentially your outside defensive end out in space. Look left, you see Scott. Look right, you see Thomas. What makes it difficult for the offense is that guy is always there — the question is whether he's dropping to cover his assignment, like the flats, or blitzing off the edge.
Miami's blitz usage was top five in the country, heavily dominated by those two apex players. Scott made roughly twice as many stops as Thomas in that role, but Thomas saw a lot more blitz usage rolling down. Our Cover 3 usage was fifth in FBS. When you can tie blitzes into that structure so the same-looking calls produce different outcomes, and different-looking calls produce the same outcome, you get Miami's defense.
DMoney: Personnel matters so much here — think of the Seattle Seahawks with Earl Thomas covering the whole field and Kam Chancellor playing more like a linebacker. How does personnel factor into how you deploy these guys, both in recruiting and in scheme?
Coach Macho: I run almost the identical system at MacArthur, so I'm the right guy to ask. That down safety — Thomas's role — has to be a hybrid linebacker-safety type. He's in the box constantly, and Hetherman does a good job moving him around in there rather than always playing him as the true apex guy — sometimes he's dropping hook-to-curl inside. That guy has to be aggressive and willing to tackle, because runs are going to bounce to him and he'll be in one-on-one tackle situations. You can't put a stereotypical DB in that role. He doesn't have to cover at an elite level because he's not playing up top — he might be covering backs out of the backfield or helping underneath on a tight end or receiver.
Kam Chancellor was that pseudo linebacker-safety type on one of the best defenses ever. Earl Thomas wasn't that — he was rangy, always playing on the roof. Personnel is everything for this system, because if you can't find a safety who can drop into the box, tackle backs and tight ends, and still cover some, it's hard to run. The hardest position for me to fill over the years has been that guy, because most DBs want to cover and don't want to tackle. What's worked is putting a kid there who's more linebacker-minded — maybe too small to play linebacker, not quite coverage-savvy enough for DB — and now you've got an enforcer to the boundary. Keionte Scott is the opposite version of that — also an enforcer, but a little better in coverage because he plays to the field side, covering slot receivers.
And remember — in Cover 3, your corners are essentially one-on-one on any vertical route. So you need a specific type of corner for this system too.
Coach Macho: Absolutely need range there, because he's in the middle of the field. It depends on the version of Cover 3 — a match version plays more like man, while a "country" Cover 3, which teams have run for decades, has that top safety covering more ground in a true zone. If you're playing match, that safety doesn't need to run as much laterally as in a country version. But either way, you need a rangy, savvy guy in the middle third — think Ed Reed, Earl Thomas. Those guys play with the quarterback's eyes, get looked off on purpose, and spin the other way. Zechariah Poyser doesn't get enough credit for that — he may not make the splash plays, but from what I understand, they can't run it without him. For us, that's Jaylen Jones ('27 Miami commit). You can't put a regular guy there.
There are also situations where the offense gives you three receivers to the strength, and now that field safety is essentially in man coverage on the third receiver — what we call "mini" or "stubby" coverage, different staffs call it different things. He has to have the range and man-coverage ability to handle that. Bryce Fitzgerald showing up in man coverage for the interception against Texas A&M is a good example of that skill set.
DMoney: Quick clarification for people reading — when we talk about the one, two, and three receiver, that's counted from the sideline in.
Coach Macho: Sideline in, yes. A lot of coverages are predicated on how many receivers you're given to a side. Some staffs run a coverage against two receivers but check to something else entirely once a third receiver shows up to that side. Most advanced-level defenses do that.
DMoney: Someone in the building told me it's not that different what Jakobe Thomas is asked to do compared to Keionte Scott at nickel — obviously different spacing, different environment, but similar assignments. What are the similarities?
Coach Macho: We cross-train them, and I know Miami does too, because the assignments are so similar. The variation is that the nickel typically sees more receivers — your boundary safety usually sees at most two receivers to his side, sometimes just a tight end, because teams rarely stack two receivers to the boundary. The nickel, playing to the field, often sees three receivers, sometimes four if you count the back out of the backfield. So there's more going on, more space, which makes it more taxing mentally and athletically — especially if you're asking him to play a complex match coverage rather than a spot drop.
Coach Macho: Physicality, willingness, and attitude. The reality is you're physically outmatched by most of the guys blocking you — if you're 190 to 205 pounds and an offensive tackle kicks out to block you, are you going to freeze or run from contact? Miami trains those guys for that. If you're running heavy blitz schemes from your apex players and DBs, you have to teach them what to do when they get blocked. Ideally the scheme draws the pressure so the blitzer stays free — Hetherman does a great job of that — but you still have to prepare guys for when they do get touched. Miami will send those apex players through pass-rush reps in practice for exactly that reason.
You're not teaching them the same moves you'd teach Armondo Blount or Akheem Mesidor, but basic leverage, a rip, a dip. And you have to teach run fits too — what happens if it's a run, not a pass, when they're sent. That cross-training gets expensive from a teaching standpoint. But you can't even start that teaching if the kid isn't willing. You're looking for a guy with a little bit of crazy in him.
Coach Macho: Miami was number two in the country in a static defense — no blitzing — defending the run. That number fell to 32nd in success rate on early downs versus the run when blitzing. Shout out to MatchQuarters.com, he's got great data on this on his site. Blitzing on early downs versus the run actually hurt Miami some. Part of the reason is what's called "time to target." Blitzing from the boundary is a shorter distance, since that boundary safety is already walked down.
DMoney: Quick pause — why does the field-and-boundary distinction matter so much in college specifically?
Coach Macho: College hashes are much wider than the NFL, and that shapes the style of offense and defense teams play. When the ball's on the hash in college, the field side is far. If you're blitzing the nickel and the offense spreads the field to that side, the time to target — how long it takes him to reach the running back or quarterback — increases a lot, since he's coming from further away. That also makes it harder to disguise and easier for the offense to identify pre-snap.
If you're blitzing the nickel on an interior run, he's part of the run fit as the edge player, but now there's a wider crease because it's taking him longer to get to his gap — giving the running back a small crease for extra yardage. I've fallen victim to that myself over the years and started checking out of those calls when given a wide split my nickel can't cover in time, sliding the responsibility to the next defender inside, usually the linebacker. I've seen Miami do the same, and Hetherman is a heavy self-evaluator, so I'm sure he's aware of those numbers too. The time to target isn't as much of an issue to the boundary side.
DMoney: That leads into the B-gap bubble. What does that mean, and how does it tie into being vulnerable when a blitzer's coming from far away?
Coach Macho: Miami runs what's called a bench front, which puts the three-technique — the strength of the front — to the boundary. That naturally creates a B-gap bubble to the field side. It's not always a problem, though, because someone is assigned to it — a linebacker, sometimes the nickel. But when you're blitzing from the nickel, the defensive end on that side is often stunting inside and may take the B gap himself, while the nickel has the C gap outside. If the timing between that end stunting and the nickel arriving isn't tight, there's a crease for the running back to hit right underneath the blitz.
That B-gap defender is often in "conflict" — if a linebacker is responsible for both the B gap and a coverage zone where the slot receiver is running, offenses will put the back to his side, fake the run so the linebacker steps up for his gap responsibility, then pull the ball and throw to the receiver he was supposed to cover. That's an RPO. There are ways to defend it, but ultimately it comes down to whoever has the last chalk mark wins — the chess match of football. In the bench front specifically, you're always going to have that natural bubble to the field-side B gap.
Coach Macho: I've seen them play it two ways. Remember all those explosive throws given up against Indiana in the first half? That was a lot of traditional bail Cover 3 — the corner plays a true deep third, not matched on a receiver, with the flat defender underneath helping him. There were moments in that game where you could see the corner directing the flat defender to take the underneath zone. In the second half, coverage tightened up and Miami played more man.
The longer the corner, the better for Cover 3 — think back to Seattle's corners. The outside third of the field is the hardest throw in football, especially deep; completion percentage on a deep outside throw is somewhere around 6%, even lower with a long corner narrowing the window further. The other option for the offense is to throw the middle of the field, which is sketchy with a range safety like Earl Thomas back there too. It's usually a better run defense as well, since you've got an extra body in the box. Bottom line: you want a corner who's long and comfortable playing man deep down the field, because past ten yards on a vertical route, it becomes man coverage regardless of the shell.
DMoney: And that's why in-breaking routes aren't as much of a concern with tall corners in that structure?
Coach Macho: Depends on the version being played. In Saban's Rip/Liz match version, invented in 1994 with the Browns, that outside corner plays true man on the outside receiver and has anything vertical — a dig, a curl, a post, anything that starts vertical, he's got it. Taller corners tend to struggle with that specific technique — I've seen it in my own career. If you're playing traditional bail Cover 3 instead, the corner may squeeze the route but isn't playing true man on it, and someone else underneath is assigned to it. It comes back to which version you're running.
DMoney: You coached our starting corners in high school, so you're the right guy for this — Xavier Lucas. There was always a corner-versus-safety question with him, whether he'd be too tight in coverage, but he's got the size and the pure speed. Does he fit this heavy Cover 3 scheme?
Coach Macho: I had Xavier for his first couple years before other guys worked with him through his transition to corner. At the time he was long and tall and hadn't grown into his body yet, already 6'1", 6'2", 190 pounds. It's difficult for guys built like that to handle in-breaking routes early on. But throw him into a deep third, and it's really hard to throw over a guy who runs a 10.5 flat and is 6'1", 6'2" — he's a prototype Cover 3 corner in that regard. The coaches who've worked with him since his move to corner have done a phenomenal job addressing that one weakness, and he's improved a lot. The thing about Xavier is once he gets his hands on you, it's extremely difficult to run any in-breaking route against him.
Coach Macho: Hetherman used to lean more on simulated pressures — different fronts, different coverages. He's scaled that down a lot, like most coordinators would with the kind of defensive line Miami has. Indiana leans heavily on simulated pressures — the illusion of bringing five, six, seven rushers while actually sending four — plus more front movement, slanting and stunting. Miami, with the personnel available now, has scaled back to more even fronts, a true four-man front, fewer simulated pressures, and more reliance on five-man pressures — bringing the free safety or the nickel as that fifth rusher. There's still maybe 20% simulated pressure in the mix, but a lot less than Indiana runs.
DMoney: What allows a staff to simulate pressure well — is that on the players, or mostly scheme?
Coach Macho: If you're simulating pressure, you're dropping defensive linemen into coverage, so you need ends athletic enough to drop — not anything complex, maybe a flat or underneath a receiver. That requires more athletic personnel, and it adds to the cross-training cost, same as with the blitzing nickels. It's not hard to install — five minutes in a circuit drill teaches the drop — but you need the right kind of athlete up front to make it work.
DMoney: Coach, we could talk all day — and we will. We'll break this into two parts. This one focused on the coverage and the back end. Next time, we get into the front.
Coach Macho: Appreciate you, man.
This article is brought to you by KashKick — get paid to do stuff you already do online. www.kashkick.com
Coach Macho: Great day to be a Cane, baby.
DMoney: Coach Hetherman's defense last year — a defense that was arguably the reason Miami missed the playoffs in 2024 — gets a personnel boost, guys come back in different roles, and suddenly you've got a top-five defense in the country, arguably the best in the country given the level of competition faced in the playoffs, especially up front. If someone mentioned Hetherman's defense among football people, not fans, what's the signature that stands out?
Coach Macho: High pressure usage and single-high coverage — closed-post coverage. Heavy dominance in Cover 3, and heavy blitz usage.
The Apex Defenders: Keionte Scott and Jakobe Thomas
DMoney: That sets up what I want to talk about — Keionte Scott and Jakobe Thomas. Huge parts of this defense. Everybody focuses on Bain and Mesidor, and rightfully so, but Scott at nickel and Thomas at boundary safety were doing something unique, especially on early downs.Coach Macho: In a Cover 3 scheme, you're always going to have one safety down — for Miami, that's Thomas at boundary safety, rolled down a lot. From an offensive standpoint, you just see Cover 3. You don't know if Scott's blitzing or Thomas is blitzing, because they're always lined up as what we call apex defenders — the guy who sets the edge, essentially your outside defensive end out in space. Look left, you see Scott. Look right, you see Thomas. What makes it difficult for the offense is that guy is always there — the question is whether he's dropping to cover his assignment, like the flats, or blitzing off the edge.
Miami's blitz usage was top five in the country, heavily dominated by those two apex players. Scott made roughly twice as many stops as Thomas in that role, but Thomas saw a lot more blitz usage rolling down. Our Cover 3 usage was fifth in FBS. When you can tie blitzes into that structure so the same-looking calls produce different outcomes, and different-looking calls produce the same outcome, you get Miami's defense.
DMoney: Personnel matters so much here — think of the Seattle Seahawks with Earl Thomas covering the whole field and Kam Chancellor playing more like a linebacker. How does personnel factor into how you deploy these guys, both in recruiting and in scheme?
Coach Macho: I run almost the identical system at MacArthur, so I'm the right guy to ask. That down safety — Thomas's role — has to be a hybrid linebacker-safety type. He's in the box constantly, and Hetherman does a good job moving him around in there rather than always playing him as the true apex guy — sometimes he's dropping hook-to-curl inside. That guy has to be aggressive and willing to tackle, because runs are going to bounce to him and he'll be in one-on-one tackle situations. You can't put a stereotypical DB in that role. He doesn't have to cover at an elite level because he's not playing up top — he might be covering backs out of the backfield or helping underneath on a tight end or receiver.
Kam Chancellor was that pseudo linebacker-safety type on one of the best defenses ever. Earl Thomas wasn't that — he was rangy, always playing on the roof. Personnel is everything for this system, because if you can't find a safety who can drop into the box, tackle backs and tight ends, and still cover some, it's hard to run. The hardest position for me to fill over the years has been that guy, because most DBs want to cover and don't want to tackle. What's worked is putting a kid there who's more linebacker-minded — maybe too small to play linebacker, not quite coverage-savvy enough for DB — and now you've got an enforcer to the boundary. Keionte Scott is the opposite version of that — also an enforcer, but a little better in coverage because he plays to the field side, covering slot receivers.
And remember — in Cover 3, your corners are essentially one-on-one on any vertical route. So you need a specific type of corner for this system too.
Breaking Down the Positions
DMoney: Let's go position by position. The guy up top, the top of the "Christmas tree" — does he need to be a Bryce Fitzgerald-level unusual athlete, or just plus range?Coach Macho: Absolutely need range there, because he's in the middle of the field. It depends on the version of Cover 3 — a match version plays more like man, while a "country" Cover 3, which teams have run for decades, has that top safety covering more ground in a true zone. If you're playing match, that safety doesn't need to run as much laterally as in a country version. But either way, you need a rangy, savvy guy in the middle third — think Ed Reed, Earl Thomas. Those guys play with the quarterback's eyes, get looked off on purpose, and spin the other way. Zechariah Poyser doesn't get enough credit for that — he may not make the splash plays, but from what I understand, they can't run it without him. For us, that's Jaylen Jones ('27 Miami commit). You can't put a regular guy there.
There are also situations where the offense gives you three receivers to the strength, and now that field safety is essentially in man coverage on the third receiver — what we call "mini" or "stubby" coverage, different staffs call it different things. He has to have the range and man-coverage ability to handle that. Bryce Fitzgerald showing up in man coverage for the interception against Texas A&M is a good example of that skill set.
DMoney: Quick clarification for people reading — when we talk about the one, two, and three receiver, that's counted from the sideline in.
Coach Macho: Sideline in, yes. A lot of coverages are predicated on how many receivers you're given to a side. Some staffs run a coverage against two receivers but check to something else entirely once a third receiver shows up to that side. Most advanced-level defenses do that.
DMoney: Someone in the building told me it's not that different what Jakobe Thomas is asked to do compared to Keionte Scott at nickel — obviously different spacing, different environment, but similar assignments. What are the similarities?
Coach Macho: We cross-train them, and I know Miami does too, because the assignments are so similar. The variation is that the nickel typically sees more receivers — your boundary safety usually sees at most two receivers to his side, sometimes just a tight end, because teams rarely stack two receivers to the boundary. The nickel, playing to the field, often sees three receivers, sometimes four if you count the back out of the backfield. So there's more going on, more space, which makes it more taxing mentally and athletically — especially if you're asking him to play a complex match coverage rather than a spot drop.
What Makes a Good Blitzer
DMoney: The blitz usage stood out to me — I didn't realize how much Miami blitzed relative to the country. You think of Manny Diaz-style aggression, not Hetherman's overhang guys blitzing that much. What do you look for in a blitzer? I've seen fast, strong guys who weren't great blitzers, and undersized guys with elite timing who were.Coach Macho: Physicality, willingness, and attitude. The reality is you're physically outmatched by most of the guys blocking you — if you're 190 to 205 pounds and an offensive tackle kicks out to block you, are you going to freeze or run from contact? Miami trains those guys for that. If you're running heavy blitz schemes from your apex players and DBs, you have to teach them what to do when they get blocked. Ideally the scheme draws the pressure so the blitzer stays free — Hetherman does a great job of that — but you still have to prepare guys for when they do get touched. Miami will send those apex players through pass-rush reps in practice for exactly that reason.
You're not teaching them the same moves you'd teach Armondo Blount or Akheem Mesidor, but basic leverage, a rip, a dip. And you have to teach run fits too — what happens if it's a run, not a pass, when they're sent. That cross-training gets expensive from a teaching standpoint. But you can't even start that teaching if the kid isn't willing. You're looking for a guy with a little bit of crazy in him.
The Blitz Numbers — and Where It Hurt
DMoney: Miami was outstanding in early-down run situations playing it straight, physical up front and in the back end. But when they did send a run blitz on early downs, it wasn't as effective. What are some reasons teams caught Miami on those draws?Coach Macho: Miami was number two in the country in a static defense — no blitzing — defending the run. That number fell to 32nd in success rate on early downs versus the run when blitzing. Shout out to MatchQuarters.com, he's got great data on this on his site. Blitzing on early downs versus the run actually hurt Miami some. Part of the reason is what's called "time to target." Blitzing from the boundary is a shorter distance, since that boundary safety is already walked down.
DMoney: Quick pause — why does the field-and-boundary distinction matter so much in college specifically?
Coach Macho: College hashes are much wider than the NFL, and that shapes the style of offense and defense teams play. When the ball's on the hash in college, the field side is far. If you're blitzing the nickel and the offense spreads the field to that side, the time to target — how long it takes him to reach the running back or quarterback — increases a lot, since he's coming from further away. That also makes it harder to disguise and easier for the offense to identify pre-snap.
If you're blitzing the nickel on an interior run, he's part of the run fit as the edge player, but now there's a wider crease because it's taking him longer to get to his gap — giving the running back a small crease for extra yardage. I've fallen victim to that myself over the years and started checking out of those calls when given a wide split my nickel can't cover in time, sliding the responsibility to the next defender inside, usually the linebacker. I've seen Miami do the same, and Hetherman is a heavy self-evaluator, so I'm sure he's aware of those numbers too. The time to target isn't as much of an issue to the boundary side.
DMoney: That leads into the B-gap bubble. What does that mean, and how does it tie into being vulnerable when a blitzer's coming from far away?
Coach Macho: Miami runs what's called a bench front, which puts the three-technique — the strength of the front — to the boundary. That naturally creates a B-gap bubble to the field side. It's not always a problem, though, because someone is assigned to it — a linebacker, sometimes the nickel. But when you're blitzing from the nickel, the defensive end on that side is often stunting inside and may take the B gap himself, while the nickel has the C gap outside. If the timing between that end stunting and the nickel arriving isn't tight, there's a crease for the running back to hit right underneath the blitz.
That B-gap defender is often in "conflict" — if a linebacker is responsible for both the B gap and a coverage zone where the slot receiver is running, offenses will put the back to his side, fake the run so the linebacker steps up for his gap responsibility, then pull the ball and throw to the receiver he was supposed to cover. That's an RPO. There are ways to defend it, but ultimately it comes down to whoever has the last chalk mark wins — the chess match of football. In the bench front specifically, you're always going to have that natural bubble to the field-side B gap.
Corners in Cover 3
DMoney: Shifting to corners — thinking back to the Seattle Seahawks, they could play Richard Sherman and Brandon Browner tight and physical because they trusted Earl Thomas over the top. How does Miami play its corners in this Cover 3, and how should they be recruiting for it?Coach Macho: I've seen them play it two ways. Remember all those explosive throws given up against Indiana in the first half? That was a lot of traditional bail Cover 3 — the corner plays a true deep third, not matched on a receiver, with the flat defender underneath helping him. There were moments in that game where you could see the corner directing the flat defender to take the underneath zone. In the second half, coverage tightened up and Miami played more man.
The longer the corner, the better for Cover 3 — think back to Seattle's corners. The outside third of the field is the hardest throw in football, especially deep; completion percentage on a deep outside throw is somewhere around 6%, even lower with a long corner narrowing the window further. The other option for the offense is to throw the middle of the field, which is sketchy with a range safety like Earl Thomas back there too. It's usually a better run defense as well, since you've got an extra body in the box. Bottom line: you want a corner who's long and comfortable playing man deep down the field, because past ten yards on a vertical route, it becomes man coverage regardless of the shell.
DMoney: And that's why in-breaking routes aren't as much of a concern with tall corners in that structure?
Coach Macho: Depends on the version being played. In Saban's Rip/Liz match version, invented in 1994 with the Browns, that outside corner plays true man on the outside receiver and has anything vertical — a dig, a curl, a post, anything that starts vertical, he's got it. Taller corners tend to struggle with that specific technique — I've seen it in my own career. If you're playing traditional bail Cover 3 instead, the corner may squeeze the route but isn't playing true man on it, and someone else underneath is assigned to it. It comes back to which version you're running.
DMoney: You coached our starting corners in high school, so you're the right guy for this — Xavier Lucas. There was always a corner-versus-safety question with him, whether he'd be too tight in coverage, but he's got the size and the pure speed. Does he fit this heavy Cover 3 scheme?
Coach Macho: I had Xavier for his first couple years before other guys worked with him through his transition to corner. At the time he was long and tall and hadn't grown into his body yet, already 6'1", 6'2", 190 pounds. It's difficult for guys built like that to handle in-breaking routes early on. But throw him into a deep third, and it's really hard to throw over a guy who runs a 10.5 flat and is 6'1", 6'2" — he's a prototype Cover 3 corner in that regard. The coaches who've worked with him since his move to corner have done a phenomenal job addressing that one weakness, and he's improved a lot. The thing about Xavier is once he gets his hands on you, it's extremely difficult to run any in-breaking route against him.
Miami vs. Indiana
DMoney: Before we get to the front next time — Indiana and Miami run similar defenses, Hetherman and the Indiana DC Bryant Haines are close, well documented. But Miami didn't play it exactly like Indiana this past year. What are the differences?Coach Macho: Hetherman used to lean more on simulated pressures — different fronts, different coverages. He's scaled that down a lot, like most coordinators would with the kind of defensive line Miami has. Indiana leans heavily on simulated pressures — the illusion of bringing five, six, seven rushers while actually sending four — plus more front movement, slanting and stunting. Miami, with the personnel available now, has scaled back to more even fronts, a true four-man front, fewer simulated pressures, and more reliance on five-man pressures — bringing the free safety or the nickel as that fifth rusher. There's still maybe 20% simulated pressure in the mix, but a lot less than Indiana runs.
DMoney: What allows a staff to simulate pressure well — is that on the players, or mostly scheme?
Coach Macho: If you're simulating pressure, you're dropping defensive linemen into coverage, so you need ends athletic enough to drop — not anything complex, maybe a flat or underneath a receiver. That requires more athletic personnel, and it adds to the cross-training cost, same as with the blitzing nickels. It's not hard to install — five minutes in a circuit drill teaches the drop — but you need the right kind of athlete up front to make it work.
DMoney: Coach, we could talk all day — and we will. We'll break this into two parts. This one focused on the coverage and the back end. Next time, we get into the front.
Coach Macho: Appreciate you, man.
This article is brought to you by KashKick — get paid to do stuff you already do online. www.kashkick.com
