forums

Wisconsin officially sues Miami over Xavier Lucas

Peachycarnahan said:
One of the elements to proving tortious interference is that the poacher knows of the contract. This assertion in the article (if accurate) that the contract is "proprietary" could be problematic for UW. I'm wondering if the contract Lucas signed has a confidentiality provision (presumably to keep the players from posting it on the internet). That little bug could tank UW's case.
Click to expand...


There is a better chance that Miami "knew" of the NIL deal with the Wisconsin collective, as "everybody's doin' it, man"...

But actual knowledge of the Wisconsin prospective rev-share deal? That one may be much harder to prove.
 
Advertisement
RVACane said:
@TheOriginalCane , look what the cat dragged in. 😂
Click to expand...


wedding crashers comedy GIF
 
TheOriginalCane said:
There is a better chance that Miami "knew" of the NIL deal with the Wisconsin collective, as "everybody's doin' it, man"...

But actual knowledge of the Wisconsin prospective rev-share deal? That one may be much harder to prove.
Click to expand...
How would anyone know the terms of the deal especially the duration?
 
hotshot said:
If that's the case, why is Wisconsin even suing? Just to appease upset fans seems a weak reason.
Click to expand...
Guess you haven't read any of this actual thread. Wisky is suing with "support" from the B10 in the hopes that a court will ratify / approve the general terms of the Memorandum of Understanding that was drafted BY the B10 and is used as a template for all B10 programs in "signing" recruits to, apparently, multi year commitments to play. It is a bigger picture than whatever "losses" WU can fantasize from the loss of service from the player.
 
NCCanefan said:
How would anyone know the terms of the deal especially the duration?
Click to expand...


I am not certain you would have to know every detail of the contract you are "tortiously interfering with". But "term" would be a relevant concept if you were "trying to outbid" an already executed contract.

Let's say Wisconsin's deals were:

NIL2 (Dec 24 to June 25) - $500K
Rev Share (June 25 to June 27) - $2 M

And then let's say Miami offered:

NIL (Jan 25 to Jan 25) - $1.5 M

If Miami doesn't know of the existence of the Rev Share deal, or we only know (vaguely) that there is an NIL deal, but not when it begins or ends), then how would we know enough to "outbid" Wisconsin?

I would certainly be curious as to whether the ACC is using a "prospective-when-House-settlement-happens" template the way that the Big 10 is.

And regardless of that point, the only way we would know anything about what Xavier Lucas signed on December 2 was if he told us. Because it appears he needed to ask for a copy TWICE afterwards.
 
Advertisement
hotshot said:
If that's the case, why is Wisconsin even suing? Just to appease upset fans seems a weak reason.
Click to expand...


This gets back to the issue of the Big 10 being the puppetmaster.

Counts 1 to 4 ask for monetary damages. But Wisconsin doesn't ask for specific monetary damages. And one wonders what Wisconsin would even due with this massive windfall.

However, Count 5 asks for a declaration related to the contracts. In my personal opinion, this is something the Big 10 wants. Why would Wisconsin care? No court is going to "return" Xavier Lucas to Wisconsin and force him to play for the Badgers.

So the declaratory relief is, I believe, the primary purpose of the litigation. The Big 10 wants ALL of its players and ALL of its rev-share-template contracts to be declared valid and enforceable.

What if Miami offered to pay $X to settle Counts 1 to 4, and then wouldn't agree to settle on Count 5? Would Wisconsin/Big 10 take that deal? Highly unlikely.
 
Peachycarnahan said:
One of the elements to proving tortious interference is that the poacher knows of the contract. This assertion in the article (if accurate) that the contract is "proprietary" could be problematic for UW. I'm wondering if the contract Lucas signed has a confidentiality provision (presumably to keep the players from posting it on the internet). That little bug could tank UW's cas
Click to expand...
They are hoping the language of the instruction saves them on this element- it's drafted very broadly. It's a tough sell IMO, but I don't know how a WI court would construe it.
Not related but something I also thought was interesting-I have only seen successful requests for declaratory relief address relief from the possibility of future injury, not used to address past behavior. Asking for a past instance to be declared the way they ask seems like a summary judgment motion, but I am not familiar with WI law on this issue.
 

Attachments

Gennaker Cane said:
They are hoping the language of the instruction saves them on this element- it's drafted very broadly. It's a tough sell IMO, but I don't know how a WI court would construe it.
Not related but something I also thought was interesting-I have only seen successful requests for declaratory relief address relief from the possibility of future injury, not used to address past behavior. Asking for a past instance to be declared the way they ask seems like a summary judgment motion, but I am not familiar with WI law on this issue.
Click to expand...


A couple of issues:

1. It appears (and I reserve the right to be wrong) that this might be the instructions related to Counts III and IV of the complaint. I believe that because:
a. There does not appear to be a "knowledge of the contract" instruction
b. There is some language at the beginning of the instruction for whether the "relationship" gives rise to a contract and whether that requires a separate set of "contract instructions", and
c. Counts I and II of the Complaint focus on Tortious Interference with a CONTRACT, while Counts III and IV of the Complaint speak of PROSPECTIVE contracts, and then (after re-alleging prior paragraphs) reference the RELATIONSHIP as the very next paragraph, and the fact that there are SEPARATE Counts I & II vs. III & IV leads me to think that there could be different and separate elements (i.e., one is not included in the other as a "lesser-included charge" type of a deal)

2. This is not to say that the instructions you attached are "wrong" or anything, and I don't think anyone is really an expert on Wisconsin forms and procedures, so I'm wondering if WI has SEPARATE instructions for the two different types of counts (I & II vs. III & IV) or if they simply make adaptations to the instructions provided, especially for Counts I and II on "knowledge" of the contract.

3. I tend to agree with your point about the Declaratory relief, particularly as it is expressed in Paragraph 85 of the Complaint. Up until this point, the Complaint has been talking about Xavier Lucas and the PAST, now UW wants the court to rhapsodize about the future. It is particularly interesting as it relates to the nature of the rev-share deals. The one that Xavier (and others signed) is completely different from those that will arise in the future. Once the House settlement is given life and a framework within the NCAA, any Big 10 rev share deals would be immediately executable and immediately enforceable (assuming they did not run afoul of any other rules). So we come right back around to the need to find the Lucas-UW rev-share deal invalid, unenforceable, and irrelevant from the outset of the signature. If so, and if the "soon-valid" contracts are going to govern future deals, then there is no need for declaratory relief.

4. Finally, there was some interesting language near the end of the instructions. The FIRST question for the jury is whether there is a valid contract, and as the form says, IN MOST CASES this question is answered by the court as a matter of law. BUT...that is likely not a valid statement here. Thus it seems like the court may need to have its own hearing/mini-trial on whether the Wisconsin rev-share deal is actually a contract BEFORE the rest of the questions ever go to a jury (or the bench) for determination of the other elements of tortious/intentional interference.
 
TheOriginalCane said:
A couple of issues:

1. It appears (and I reserve the right to be wrong) that this might be the instructions related to Counts III and IV of the complaint. I believe that because:
a. There does not appear to be a "knowledge of the contract" instruction
b. There is some language at the beginning of the instruction for whether the "relationship" gives rise to a contract and whether that requires a separate set of "contract instructions", and
c. Counts I and II of the Complaint focus on Tortious Interference with a CONTRACT, while Counts III and IV of the Complaint speak of PROSPECTIVE contracts, and then (after re-alleging prior paragraphs) reference the RELATIONSHIP as the very next paragraph, and the fact that there are SEPARATE Counts I & II vs. III & IV leads me to think that there could be different and separate elements (i.e., one is not included in the other as a "lesser-included charge" type of a deal)

2. This is not to say that the instructions you attached are "wrong" or anything, and I don't think anyone is really an expert on Wisconsin forms and procedures, so I'm wondering if WI has SEPARATE instructions for the two different types of counts (I & II vs. III & IV) or if they simply make adaptations to the instructions provided, especially for Counts I and II on "knowledge" of the contract.

3. I tend to agree with your point about the Declaratory relief, particularly as it is expressed in Paragraph 85 of the Complaint. Up until this point, the Complaint has been talking about Xavier Lucas and the PAST, now UW wants the court to rhapsodize about the future. It is particularly interesting as it relates to the nature of the rev-share deals. The one that Xavier (and others signed) is completely different from those that will arise in the future. Once the House settlement is given life and a framework within the NCAA, any Big 10 rev share deals would be immediately executable and immediately enforceable (assuming they did not run afoul of any other rules). So we come right back around to the need to find the Lucas-UW rev-share deal invalid, unenforceable, and irrelevant from the outset of the signature. If so, and if the "soon-valid" contracts are going to govern future deals, then there is no need for declaratory relief.

4. Finally, there was some interesting language near the end of the instructions. The FIRST question for the jury is whether there is a valid contract, and as the form says, IN MOST CASES this question is answered by the court as a matter of law. BUT...that is likely not a valid statement here. Thus it seems like the court may need to have its own hearing/mini-trial on whether the Wisconsin rev-share deal is actually a contract BEFORE the rest of the questions ever go to a jury (or the bench) for determination of the other elements of tortious/intentional interference.
Click to expand...
Strong points. There could/should be more than this instruction for all the reasons you stated. This is the only one I saw addressing interference with contractual rights, but I didn't search for more than what was listed on the site where I found it either, nor did I search very long. If I get a chance I'll try to look for this later.
So many issues that this complaint skims over or assumes . . .
 
Advertisement
Rickd said:
Great presentation ... CONTROL is exactly what the B10 wants ... for MULTIPLE YEARS.
Click to expand...


Yes. The "multiple years" thing truly concerns me.

And things are getting verrrrrry close to "statutory employee" status...
 
Back
Top