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POP plays
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Yes, I think you will see a lot of PAP (Play Action Pass) in Richt's offense because he runs a pro system with the QB under center. I don't remember a lot of PAP in Coley's system. I think our offense ran more screens than anything. I hope that we run less screen plays and become less predictable. But anything would be an improvement over Coley's system.
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Do you mean RPO's (run pass option)?
POP plays and the pro-style offense - Football Study Hall
POP plays and the pro-style offense
By Ian Boyd [MENTION=8172]ian[/MENTION]_A_Boyd on Oct 2, 2014, 11:24a 14
Jason Getz-USA TODAY Sports
The emergence of the "play-option pass" has breathed new life into the pro-style schools of offense.
When you think of the modern option game, with the introduction of screen or quick game reads for the QB, you think of spread offenses. You think of Air Raid teams in the Mike Leach tree, or spread option teams of the Gus Malzahn or Urban Meyer variety. Rarely are these new concepts associated with coaches like Lane Kiffin or teams that play pro-style offensive football. Yet these schemes are grabbing a major foothold within those systems.
Many major programs, like Oklahoma and Alabama, are finding that there's no reason to leave POP plays and the powerful constraint they put on a defense defending the run to these spread-happy teams. If you're a team that loves to pound the football why not incorporate some POP designs of your own to allow your QB to punish opponents?
As it turns out, the POP play has proven to be football's greatest gift to offensive coaches who prefer the pro-style approach.
The convergence of tactical history
In reality, many pro-style schools of offense were already heavily influenced by option principles. When a coach like Bobby Petrino is teaching his quarterback all the post-snap reads and adjustments of a passing concept like "shallow cross" he's basically teaching an option play. Except the QB doesn't run the ball and all the post-snap decision making is taking place with receivers against coverage rather than ball carriers against run defenders.
West Coast teams initially replaced much of what running the football is intended to provide by introducing quick timing throws that allow an offense to move the chains and control possession.
This presented some problems when applied at the college level as such teams often struggled to build great running games because of the practice time needed to install and master ball-control passing tactics.
The Air Raid started out as an evolution on West Coast offensive tactics with the run game becoming more of an afterthought that coaches would turn to only if defenses totally stymied their passing attacks by disregarding any threat of a run. With a few formational tweaks like adding receivers, widening out OL, adding more screen passes, and overhauling practice and install the Air Raid coaches found they could run these pass concepts at a very high level in the college game.
However, eventually Air Raid coaches like Dana Holgorsen realized that to reach the final level, the system needed to be able to present the threat of a running to protect the OL from aggressive pass-rushers as well as to set up play-action and the kind of vertical passes that put points on the board.
Meanwhile, traditional power-running schools of offensive football have always looked to marry the run game with the passing game through play-action. The Air Coryell school of pro-style offense is all about moving the chains with the running game while using the vertical passing game to do the real damage when defenses cheat up to stop the run.
In the play-option pass, all these schools are seeing the marriage of pass and run in a way that's changing the game.
How the POP play streamlines the pro-style approach
For West Coast teams that love to use quick-hitting pass plays to move the chains, the POP play is a God-send for how it integrates what that team has to spend practice time on.
For every POP play, the receivers don't have to worry so much about blocking defensive backs (unless it's a screen) and the OL don't have to master a pass protection scheme. The receiver run their routes, the OL and RB run their blocking scheme, and the QB chooses which play is going to find success based on simple pre and post-snap reads.
When standard downs are dominated by these tactics the whole process is simplified for the offense while simultaneously becoming more challenging for the defense. It's now much easier for a team to have both a great running game as well as a quick passing game since packaged POP plays allow each to feed off the other.
For the Air Coryell teams, they are finding that a quick slant, fade, or even post route can be possible on a running play before the OL gets more than three yards downfield and violates a rule.
You can train a savvy defender to recognize the difference between a true running play and a play-action block, even when the offense is pulling a guard or the QB is faking a run.
But with the vertical POP plays, there is no read for the defense. It can be a run or a pass and the only way to know for sure is to wait and see whether the QB hands off or throws it past you. What's more, you can now run deep play-option passes off zone runs and not feel the need to pull a guard to suck in the defense. They should be sucked in regardless, because it's a real running play rather than a simulation.
These developments are also a big boon to the classic, statuesque QB who was otherwise starting to lose his place in the modern game. If you can read defenders and protect your running game with pass constraints just as easily as option QBs did with their legs there's not the same need for the QB to be a brilliant athlete.
It will never hurt an offense if the QB is a great athlete but with the POP play, pro-style teams can integrate option reads into their running game without having to compromise what they look for in a QB in order to ensure they have an athlete. This is no minor detail.
If the strong-armed, quick thinking, but slow-footed QB can be a weapon in a west coast-inspired spread or a vertical Air Coryell system that opens the door for a lot of great football players to do impressive things.
The vertical POP play and smashmouth football
Read various commenters talk about the POP play and they'll inevitably say "it works best with a dual-threat QB" as they are generally thinking of the Auburn play against Alabama or a similar variety of POP play that involves the QB having the option to throw on the run.
Or perhaps they just think of how the POP play allows an athletic QB who's limited as a passer to have the opportunity to make easy reads and quick throws that can do serious damage.
Those points are all true, but the most devastating practitioner of a POP play may be a great passing QB throwing off runs from formations with big personnel.
Some examples:
This Bama play is flagged and called back for having too many men in the backfield, not due to having linemen downfield or any other violation of the play.
The timing on the throw is perfect and could be theoretically triggered on this play any time that Blake Sims felt that Amari Cooper had a good chance to get off the line of scrimmage and run past his defender...which is often.
Alabama is slowly integrating these types of plays, but it's no accident that Cooper has 655 receiving yards through four games this season. Kiffin is finding ways to get him isolated and alone against overmatched defenders and one of those ways is via the POP play.
Another example with Oklahoma and Sterling Shephard, again we see precision timing on a deep fade route:
The design of the play is to punish teams for outnumbering the run, except this way the coaches don't have to wait for to punish that move, they can punish it immediately with Knight attacking the corner to whichever side sees their safety drop down in the box. In this instance, West Virginia foolishly dropped the safety on Shephard's side (Z receiver):
Ou_vertical_pop_medium
If the defense were to commit that deep safety to making sure that Shephard couldn't get behind the corner then they'd become very vulnerable to Durron Neal running the post route on the other side of the field. They already are vulnerable as you can see Neal gets inside of the corner, Knight simply hasn't looked that way very often yet.
Even when these teams aren't running POP plays, the mere threat of both their run game as well as their POP plays forces defense to either commit two players to these receivers at all times or risk surrendering stat lines like 10 receptions for 201 yards (Cooper vs Florida) or eight catches for 177 yards (Shephard vs Tulsa).
You're going to continue to see pro-style teams equip their quarterbacks with POP vertical reads instead of just normal play-action, which is going to have a multiplier effect on their run game, their QB's ability to wield the offense at the line of scrimmage (more up-tempo tactics?), and the stats of their big time outside receivers.
If you're a big play WR who wants to be featured on Sportscenter (which is virtually all of them), the pro-style offense just evened up with the spread for how it can give you easy opportunities to run deep routes against man coverage without the risk of getting popped at the end by a deep safety.
Pro-style teams have always been ones that simply take the ideas of the option, like post-snap reads and on the fly adjustments, and then added more precise and complex execution of those ideas to beat up foes. It's no surprise that they are doing the same with the spread-option's newest ideas.
It may just be that the result of all of offensive football's crazy developments is the creation of pro-style offenses that are easier and more effective for college teams than ever before. Just make sure you give credit where credit is due, guys. You didn't get this one from the pros.
POP plays and the pro-style offense
By Ian Boyd [MENTION=8172]ian[/MENTION]_A_Boyd on Oct 2, 2014, 11:24a 14
Jason Getz-USA TODAY Sports
The emergence of the "play-option pass" has breathed new life into the pro-style schools of offense.
When you think of the modern option game, with the introduction of screen or quick game reads for the QB, you think of spread offenses. You think of Air Raid teams in the Mike Leach tree, or spread option teams of the Gus Malzahn or Urban Meyer variety. Rarely are these new concepts associated with coaches like Lane Kiffin or teams that play pro-style offensive football. Yet these schemes are grabbing a major foothold within those systems.
Many major programs, like Oklahoma and Alabama, are finding that there's no reason to leave POP plays and the powerful constraint they put on a defense defending the run to these spread-happy teams. If you're a team that loves to pound the football why not incorporate some POP designs of your own to allow your QB to punish opponents?
As it turns out, the POP play has proven to be football's greatest gift to offensive coaches who prefer the pro-style approach.
The convergence of tactical history
In reality, many pro-style schools of offense were already heavily influenced by option principles. When a coach like Bobby Petrino is teaching his quarterback all the post-snap reads and adjustments of a passing concept like "shallow cross" he's basically teaching an option play. Except the QB doesn't run the ball and all the post-snap decision making is taking place with receivers against coverage rather than ball carriers against run defenders.
West Coast teams initially replaced much of what running the football is intended to provide by introducing quick timing throws that allow an offense to move the chains and control possession.
This presented some problems when applied at the college level as such teams often struggled to build great running games because of the practice time needed to install and master ball-control passing tactics.
The Air Raid started out as an evolution on West Coast offensive tactics with the run game becoming more of an afterthought that coaches would turn to only if defenses totally stymied their passing attacks by disregarding any threat of a run. With a few formational tweaks like adding receivers, widening out OL, adding more screen passes, and overhauling practice and install the Air Raid coaches found they could run these pass concepts at a very high level in the college game.
However, eventually Air Raid coaches like Dana Holgorsen realized that to reach the final level, the system needed to be able to present the threat of a running to protect the OL from aggressive pass-rushers as well as to set up play-action and the kind of vertical passes that put points on the board.
Meanwhile, traditional power-running schools of offensive football have always looked to marry the run game with the passing game through play-action. The Air Coryell school of pro-style offense is all about moving the chains with the running game while using the vertical passing game to do the real damage when defenses cheat up to stop the run.
In the play-option pass, all these schools are seeing the marriage of pass and run in a way that's changing the game.
How the POP play streamlines the pro-style approach
For West Coast teams that love to use quick-hitting pass plays to move the chains, the POP play is a God-send for how it integrates what that team has to spend practice time on.
For every POP play, the receivers don't have to worry so much about blocking defensive backs (unless it's a screen) and the OL don't have to master a pass protection scheme. The receiver run their routes, the OL and RB run their blocking scheme, and the QB chooses which play is going to find success based on simple pre and post-snap reads.
When standard downs are dominated by these tactics the whole process is simplified for the offense while simultaneously becoming more challenging for the defense. It's now much easier for a team to have both a great running game as well as a quick passing game since packaged POP plays allow each to feed off the other.
For the Air Coryell teams, they are finding that a quick slant, fade, or even post route can be possible on a running play before the OL gets more than three yards downfield and violates a rule.
You can train a savvy defender to recognize the difference between a true running play and a play-action block, even when the offense is pulling a guard or the QB is faking a run.
But with the vertical POP plays, there is no read for the defense. It can be a run or a pass and the only way to know for sure is to wait and see whether the QB hands off or throws it past you. What's more, you can now run deep play-option passes off zone runs and not feel the need to pull a guard to suck in the defense. They should be sucked in regardless, because it's a real running play rather than a simulation.
These developments are also a big boon to the classic, statuesque QB who was otherwise starting to lose his place in the modern game. If you can read defenders and protect your running game with pass constraints just as easily as option QBs did with their legs there's not the same need for the QB to be a brilliant athlete.
It will never hurt an offense if the QB is a great athlete but with the POP play, pro-style teams can integrate option reads into their running game without having to compromise what they look for in a QB in order to ensure they have an athlete. This is no minor detail.
If the strong-armed, quick thinking, but slow-footed QB can be a weapon in a west coast-inspired spread or a vertical Air Coryell system that opens the door for a lot of great football players to do impressive things.
The vertical POP play and smashmouth football
Read various commenters talk about the POP play and they'll inevitably say "it works best with a dual-threat QB" as they are generally thinking of the Auburn play against Alabama or a similar variety of POP play that involves the QB having the option to throw on the run.
Or perhaps they just think of how the POP play allows an athletic QB who's limited as a passer to have the opportunity to make easy reads and quick throws that can do serious damage.
Those points are all true, but the most devastating practitioner of a POP play may be a great passing QB throwing off runs from formations with big personnel.
Some examples:
This Bama play is flagged and called back for having too many men in the backfield, not due to having linemen downfield or any other violation of the play.
The timing on the throw is perfect and could be theoretically triggered on this play any time that Blake Sims felt that Amari Cooper had a good chance to get off the line of scrimmage and run past his defender...which is often.
Alabama is slowly integrating these types of plays, but it's no accident that Cooper has 655 receiving yards through four games this season. Kiffin is finding ways to get him isolated and alone against overmatched defenders and one of those ways is via the POP play.
Another example with Oklahoma and Sterling Shephard, again we see precision timing on a deep fade route:
The design of the play is to punish teams for outnumbering the run, except this way the coaches don't have to wait for to punish that move, they can punish it immediately with Knight attacking the corner to whichever side sees their safety drop down in the box. In this instance, West Virginia foolishly dropped the safety on Shephard's side (Z receiver):
Ou_vertical_pop_medium
If the defense were to commit that deep safety to making sure that Shephard couldn't get behind the corner then they'd become very vulnerable to Durron Neal running the post route on the other side of the field. They already are vulnerable as you can see Neal gets inside of the corner, Knight simply hasn't looked that way very often yet.
Even when these teams aren't running POP plays, the mere threat of both their run game as well as their POP plays forces defense to either commit two players to these receivers at all times or risk surrendering stat lines like 10 receptions for 201 yards (Cooper vs Florida) or eight catches for 177 yards (Shephard vs Tulsa).
You're going to continue to see pro-style teams equip their quarterbacks with POP vertical reads instead of just normal play-action, which is going to have a multiplier effect on their run game, their QB's ability to wield the offense at the line of scrimmage (more up-tempo tactics?), and the stats of their big time outside receivers.
If you're a big play WR who wants to be featured on Sportscenter (which is virtually all of them), the pro-style offense just evened up with the spread for how it can give you easy opportunities to run deep routes against man coverage without the risk of getting popped at the end by a deep safety.
Pro-style teams have always been ones that simply take the ideas of the option, like post-snap reads and on the fly adjustments, and then added more precise and complex execution of those ideas to beat up foes. It's no surprise that they are doing the same with the spread-option's newest ideas.
It may just be that the result of all of offensive football's crazy developments is the creation of pro-style offenses that are easier and more effective for college teams than ever before. Just make sure you give credit where credit is due, guys. You didn't get this one from the pros.
Good read. Very insightful.
pyhooya
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Does anyone really know what Richt's offense is going to run? Was it HIS offense the last 8-10 years at Georgia?
If I had to guess, I would go back to Ritch's first four seasons at UGA 2001-2004. He obviously will make changes and add a few wrinkles here or there, but I doubt if he develops an entirely brand new offense. Check out the UGA vs Ten game and look at the various formations.
I choose this because this is where Ritch had his most success with the offense under his total control. And this is the time period he is referring to when he says he want to coach QB and call plays again. Here is the type of success that he had in 2002:
2002: 'Dogs go 13-1, win first SEC championship in 20 years, defeated Florida State in the Nokia Sugar Bowl, and finished the season with a number three national ranking. Georgia's championship run was a complete team effort, with the Dogs winning five games by a touchdown or less. Among Richt's team were three first team All-Americans and eight first team All-SEC performers. Richt himself was a consensus choice as SEC Coach of the Year and was a finalist for the Bear Bryant National Coach of the Year Award. In addition, the '02 Bulldogs led the SEC in both scoring offense (32.2 ppg) and scoring defense (15.1 ppg).
[video=youtube;GrpN4c5OhIU]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GrpN4c5OhIU[/video]
I choose this because this is where Ritch had his most success with the offense under his total control. And this is the time period he is referring to when he says he want to coach QB and call plays again. Here is the type of success that he had in 2002:
2002: 'Dogs go 13-1, win first SEC championship in 20 years, defeated Florida State in the Nokia Sugar Bowl, and finished the season with a number three national ranking. Georgia's championship run was a complete team effort, with the Dogs winning five games by a touchdown or less. Among Richt's team were three first team All-Americans and eight first team All-SEC performers. Richt himself was a consensus choice as SEC Coach of the Year and was a finalist for the Bear Bryant National Coach of the Year Award. In addition, the '02 Bulldogs led the SEC in both scoring offense (32.2 ppg) and scoring defense (15.1 ppg).
[video=youtube;GrpN4c5OhIU]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GrpN4c5OhIU[/video]
Last edited:
https://youtu.be/IfZujFfiiMs
Coley incorporated a lot of POP plays. At the 1:44, 2:22, and 3:03 you can see him using it.
You will also find other times where he does a "soft" fake which cause the linebackers to move forward slightly. The first two throws he does this.
Coley incorporated a lot of POP plays. At the 1:44, 2:22, and 3:03 you can see him using it.
You will also find other times where he does a "soft" fake which cause the linebackers to move forward slightly. The first two throws he does this.
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Kaaya and Njoku made a living on these plays. Hope they stay in the offense
Miami has to get tougher, but Mark Richt's offense should be an instant boost - SBNation.com
There was a time when Miami's offense was at the forefront of innovation. When Howard Schnellenberger began transforming the private school into a major power in 1979, he installed a "pro-style" passing attack that was not yet the norm in college football. Ten years later, the Hurricanes took another step forward with Dennis Erickson's single-back offense.
But since then, the school has been married to pro-style systems. It adhered to that tradition when replacing Al Golden with Mark Richt.
The fact that they had the opportunity to bring aboard such a coach was somewhat surprising after his Dawgs finished 9-3. It only took one year of poor offensive performance for Richt to get the axe, and that year happened to include the Dawgs losing their best player, Nick Chubb, as they were adjusting to their first year without longtime OC Mike Bobo.
The trends before Richt was fired were remarkably positive, as UGA sought that elusive combination of fielding an elite defense and elite offense in the same year.
Year Record Offensive S&P+ Defensive S&P+
2011 10-4 39th 4th
2012 12-2 6th 28th
2013 8-5 8th 36th
2014 10-3 6th 17th
2015 9-3 71st 11th
Georgia has consistently been top 10 in either offense or defense, but not at either pinnacle at the same time. The drop off with new OC Brian Schottenheimer was so considerable, it shattered trust in Richt. (He's said he plans to call plays himself at Miami, which he did for roughly the first half of his time at Georgia, and be more involved with quarterbacks.)
What really brought down the offense was not necessarily the system or the lack of Chubb, as Georgia had other good backs, but QB play. While Greyson Lambert's numbers looked solid (7.65 yards per attempt, 12-2 TD-INT ratio) he only threw for 1,959 yards and couldn't do enough damage to stop teams from loading the box to stop the run while playing man coverage on the outside.
At his new digs, Richt is inheriting an offense that was better than his last (45th in offensive S&P+) thanks almost entirely to QB Brad Kaaya.
Although lead runner Joseph Yearby ran for 1,002 yards, Miami ranked 116th in rushing S&P+ in 2015, but 12th in passing. In order to get the offense at the level of his better Georgia units, Richt is going to need to follow a two-step process while the Canes recruit and develop.
Step 1: Teach Kaaya the new passing system
Although Richt's offenses have featured some successful QBs, they've generally been more run-centric. That's not going to work with what Miami's fielded, and he's going to have to lean on Kaaya while establishing a culture.
Both Miami and Georgia have integrated spread principles and run/pass options into pro-style systems. But the aim is to make use of a good QB to punish defenses that load the box to stop the run. They don't help teams that just can't block.
Last year, Georgia couldn't make great use of RPOs because its passing game wasn't reliable. So in an instance like you see below, when Tennessee was loading the box, Georgia couldn't punish:
Miami also used RPOs and spread sets to help its running game. Kaaya made effective reads and throws, but they didn't make the run work.
Offenses usually use RPOs to accomplish one of two aims. They can get favorable numbers to run, or they can force the defense to play man coverage and honest fronts against the run. Against Florida State, Miami got man coverage and honest fronts, but was unable to make anything of them:
Forcing man coverage does help the pass, though. And that's where the Canes have to make their living in 2016. Fortunately, Richt is known for his passing concepts that work independently of the run.
For instance, there's his take on the shallow cross route, which he uses to set up the best pass in football, the curl/flat combo.
Richt shallow cross
Richt uses the threat of the outside receiver (X) running at a sprint across the middle of the field to open the passing window for the curl route (Y), and barring that, the flat route (H). Most coaches have some use for the shallow crossing route, but not all combine it with the equally devastating curl-flat combo.
Kaaya has a strong and accurate enough arm to nail the curl route, the second read in this progression. The sole returning starting receiver for Miami, Stacy Coley, is the kind of athlete who could catch the ball on the run in the crossing route or get open and pick up yards after catch in the curl.
Last year, Georgia made good use of a three-vertical combination that showed off Lambert's strong arm and which would be a good fit for Kaaya.
Richt 3-verts
WIth a vertical route from the slot (Y) to occupy the safety (F) and a wheel route on the outside (Z) to rub man coverage, that outside receiver (X) can find space to settle in. Unlike four verticals or ball-control concepts like shallow cross, this would make use of seven-man blocking to ensure the QB had time to throw down the field. With Miami's cast of tight ends, who can all run and catch, it should be easy for Richt to present Kaaya with deep targets.
Step 2: Install a physical, two-back running game
Diverse passing should buy RIcht time for the much more difficult task, building a physical run game. While Richt has always used dropback passing that isn't tied to the run through extensive play action or RPOs, his system is about running the ball.
At Georgia, this was often accomplished through a two-back run game (using a fullback) and zone runs with a lead blocker, in which backs would find opportunities after the snap. For instance:
It's a standard inside-zone run to the weakside, with the fullback looking to take out a linebacker in the hole. Here the fullback sees the flow coming and works to the cutback lane, then picks off the strong safety trying to fill it. Sony Michel follows him, and the result is a 30-yard gain against an eight-man front despite only seven blockers.
Lead zone cutback
The keys here are the flexibility of the design and the misdirection that sets up the middle linebacker (M) to run out of the play. While the two backs aim for the playside (to the right, in this example), the offensive linemen work their way to the linebackers after controlling the line with double teams. The fullback is looking to find a good lane to lead through before picking off the most dangerous available defender. They are eager for the play to become a cutback to the other side, but the blockers have rules to ensure positive gains regardless of what happens after the snap.
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Miami has fullbacks, including Auburn transfer Gage Batten, but preferred single-back sets under Golden and would likely use a second tight end instead of a fullback for now. It's most likely Richt also emphasizes single-back sets, rather than forcing a running game that isn't currently worth supporting by taking receivers off the field.
In 2016, Miami will have to create space for the run with RPOs and some spread sets. That will make use of Kaaya's ability to make good reads and throw with accuracy and velocity. Meanwhile, Miami has to get the OL to the level of the better Georgia lines of the last decade and build some depth at fullback.
When Richt gets this offense rolling, only one thing will remain in the way of Miami getting back on track to taking advantage of one of the best pools of talent in the country: building the kind of defense that used to define the program. So let's see if Miami's the place where Richt can eventually have a top offense and defense at the same time.
There was a time when Miami's offense was at the forefront of innovation. When Howard Schnellenberger began transforming the private school into a major power in 1979, he installed a "pro-style" passing attack that was not yet the norm in college football. Ten years later, the Hurricanes took another step forward with Dennis Erickson's single-back offense.
But since then, the school has been married to pro-style systems. It adhered to that tradition when replacing Al Golden with Mark Richt.
The fact that they had the opportunity to bring aboard such a coach was somewhat surprising after his Dawgs finished 9-3. It only took one year of poor offensive performance for Richt to get the axe, and that year happened to include the Dawgs losing their best player, Nick Chubb, as they were adjusting to their first year without longtime OC Mike Bobo.
The trends before Richt was fired were remarkably positive, as UGA sought that elusive combination of fielding an elite defense and elite offense in the same year.
Year Record Offensive S&P+ Defensive S&P+
2011 10-4 39th 4th
2012 12-2 6th 28th
2013 8-5 8th 36th
2014 10-3 6th 17th
2015 9-3 71st 11th
Georgia has consistently been top 10 in either offense or defense, but not at either pinnacle at the same time. The drop off with new OC Brian Schottenheimer was so considerable, it shattered trust in Richt. (He's said he plans to call plays himself at Miami, which he did for roughly the first half of his time at Georgia, and be more involved with quarterbacks.)
What really brought down the offense was not necessarily the system or the lack of Chubb, as Georgia had other good backs, but QB play. While Greyson Lambert's numbers looked solid (7.65 yards per attempt, 12-2 TD-INT ratio) he only threw for 1,959 yards and couldn't do enough damage to stop teams from loading the box to stop the run while playing man coverage on the outside.
At his new digs, Richt is inheriting an offense that was better than his last (45th in offensive S&P+) thanks almost entirely to QB Brad Kaaya.
Although lead runner Joseph Yearby ran for 1,002 yards, Miami ranked 116th in rushing S&P+ in 2015, but 12th in passing. In order to get the offense at the level of his better Georgia units, Richt is going to need to follow a two-step process while the Canes recruit and develop.
Step 1: Teach Kaaya the new passing system
Although Richt's offenses have featured some successful QBs, they've generally been more run-centric. That's not going to work with what Miami's fielded, and he's going to have to lean on Kaaya while establishing a culture.
Both Miami and Georgia have integrated spread principles and run/pass options into pro-style systems. But the aim is to make use of a good QB to punish defenses that load the box to stop the run. They don't help teams that just can't block.
Last year, Georgia couldn't make great use of RPOs because its passing game wasn't reliable. So in an instance like you see below, when Tennessee was loading the box, Georgia couldn't punish:
Miami also used RPOs and spread sets to help its running game. Kaaya made effective reads and throws, but they didn't make the run work.
Offenses usually use RPOs to accomplish one of two aims. They can get favorable numbers to run, or they can force the defense to play man coverage and honest fronts against the run. Against Florida State, Miami got man coverage and honest fronts, but was unable to make anything of them:
Forcing man coverage does help the pass, though. And that's where the Canes have to make their living in 2016. Fortunately, Richt is known for his passing concepts that work independently of the run.
For instance, there's his take on the shallow cross route, which he uses to set up the best pass in football, the curl/flat combo.
Richt shallow cross
Richt uses the threat of the outside receiver (X) running at a sprint across the middle of the field to open the passing window for the curl route (Y), and barring that, the flat route (H). Most coaches have some use for the shallow crossing route, but not all combine it with the equally devastating curl-flat combo.
Kaaya has a strong and accurate enough arm to nail the curl route, the second read in this progression. The sole returning starting receiver for Miami, Stacy Coley, is the kind of athlete who could catch the ball on the run in the crossing route or get open and pick up yards after catch in the curl.
Last year, Georgia made good use of a three-vertical combination that showed off Lambert's strong arm and which would be a good fit for Kaaya.
Richt 3-verts
WIth a vertical route from the slot (Y) to occupy the safety (F) and a wheel route on the outside (Z) to rub man coverage, that outside receiver (X) can find space to settle in. Unlike four verticals or ball-control concepts like shallow cross, this would make use of seven-man blocking to ensure the QB had time to throw down the field. With Miami's cast of tight ends, who can all run and catch, it should be easy for Richt to present Kaaya with deep targets.
Step 2: Install a physical, two-back running game
Diverse passing should buy RIcht time for the much more difficult task, building a physical run game. While Richt has always used dropback passing that isn't tied to the run through extensive play action or RPOs, his system is about running the ball.
At Georgia, this was often accomplished through a two-back run game (using a fullback) and zone runs with a lead blocker, in which backs would find opportunities after the snap. For instance:
It's a standard inside-zone run to the weakside, with the fullback looking to take out a linebacker in the hole. Here the fullback sees the flow coming and works to the cutback lane, then picks off the strong safety trying to fill it. Sony Michel follows him, and the result is a 30-yard gain against an eight-man front despite only seven blockers.
Lead zone cutback
The keys here are the flexibility of the design and the misdirection that sets up the middle linebacker (M) to run out of the play. While the two backs aim for the playside (to the right, in this example), the offensive linemen work their way to the linebackers after controlling the line with double teams. The fullback is looking to find a good lane to lead through before picking off the most dangerous available defender. They are eager for the play to become a cutback to the other side, but the blockers have rules to ensure positive gains regardless of what happens after the snap.
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Miami has fullbacks, including Auburn transfer Gage Batten, but preferred single-back sets under Golden and would likely use a second tight end instead of a fullback for now. It's most likely Richt also emphasizes single-back sets, rather than forcing a running game that isn't currently worth supporting by taking receivers off the field.
In 2016, Miami will have to create space for the run with RPOs and some spread sets. That will make use of Kaaya's ability to make good reads and throw with accuracy and velocity. Meanwhile, Miami has to get the OL to the level of the better Georgia lines of the last decade and build some depth at fullback.
When Richt gets this offense rolling, only one thing will remain in the way of Miami getting back on track to taking advantage of one of the best pools of talent in the country: building the kind of defense that used to define the program. So let's see if Miami's the place where Richt can eventually have a top offense and defense at the same time.
Canezum5
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Good first post!!!
Billy D Williams
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I think all but the most dedicated spread teams run multiple sets. I think doing so allows you to discover teams weaknesses defensively and then you can exploit those weaknesses. Every DC makes adjustments, except that idiot Dorito, when find something that works. The offense in turn then has to exploit the adjustment by being multiple.
Coach Macho
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It was RPO's that he made a living off of last year, not the play action.
Rich ran play action pass in all of his systems at FSU and UGA. POP is good but I think Richt will stick with what he's been successful with. I think this will make Kayaa a better QB on the collegiate level and the pro level. I can't wait to see this kid this year he's going to be great!
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Or is what kayaa does RPO and the POP is what malzahn did in iron bowl?
Evolving the option - SBNation.com
Evolving the option - SBNation.com
Coach Macho
aka Beardy Ryan
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RPO (Run Pass Option) is a run play and a pass play at the same time. It's not play-action.
The QB is reading a specific defender. If that defender commits to the run fake the QB pulls the ball and throws it to the WR running through the defender's vacant zone. If the defender stays with the WR then the QB simply hands the ball off.
It's a ***** to defend. Nearly impossible to defend it out of a 2-high coverage.
The QB is reading a specific defender. If that defender commits to the run fake the QB pulls the ball and throws it to the WR running through the defender's vacant zone. If the defender stays with the WR then the QB simply hands the ball off.
It's a ***** to defend. Nearly impossible to defend it out of a 2-high coverage.
Zbrod95
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It is impossible to defend In 2-high. Safeties are too deep and the corners are 5-6 yards off the receiver...you're just for a 20+ yard gain
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