Canes Concepts: Defending Money Downs

This is where I though blake baker f*cked up. Gotta quit being so cute and over aggressive on 3rd and 4th down. That UNC call was atrocious.

Until we give up a few of these playing back. Then the "where is the aggressiveness?" calls will start.
 
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There are two glaring issues with this analysis, one of which is mentioned in the last section:
1) This analysis penalizes the defense for the cost of being overly aggressive (i.e. giving up some 3rd downs), but does not take into account the benefit, which is field position improvements from a sack/TFL or TO. Obviously a TO is less valuable when the alternative is a punt, but even in this comparison it creates 20-40 yards of field position.
2) If there is little stickiness year-to-year, a big portion of 3rd down success is luck.

Given these two points, idk if one can conclude Miami was "mediocre" on 3rd down. 3rd down D could stand to improve, of course, but this analysis misses one of the positive impacts of Miami's style and doesn't take into account randomness.
 
In this edition of Canes Concepts I want to look at an area that has brought the vitriol to the doorstep of defensive coordinator Blake Baker; third down defense. How did Miami fare on the most important down and how did it look on film? Keep reading as we explore together.

Methodology

The process I used to compile my success percentages is a little different than you may read on certain websites so I wanted to clarify how I calculated:

  • A first down picked up by penalty was calculated as a success for that play type. For instance, a 3rd & 10 picked up after a targeting penalty would be a pass success for 15 yards.
  • Success on 3rd down is considered pass/fail, so if picked up it’s successful, if not, it’s not successful despite the fact that several of these drives were extended by successful conversions on 4th down (which I’ll cover)
  • I am not including fake punts/FG’s in the data, so Florida and Georgia Tech picking up a first down on a fake punt is not included (both those drives ended in touchdowns, which were killers)
  • Sacks come out of the success rates for passing, not rushing
By the Numbers

In 2019, Miami once again had a very strong defense, ranking highly in most statistical categories. Here is how they ranked nationally in a few important categories:
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Despite ranking fairly well from an overall standpoint, there is an area that Miami struggled defensively in 2019: getting off the field on money downs.
  • Going strictly by the overall data, Miami finished 42nd out of 130 FBS teams by allowing 37.1% of 3rd downs to be converted (69th percentile)
  • Compared to just Power-5 teams the numbers are slightly worse at 25th out of 65 teams (63rd percentile)
  • Miami faced a schedule with three opponent offense’s that ranked in the 100’s nationally for third down conversions. Only four of their opponents even ranked in the top-50 nationally.
  • The Hurricanes’ defense was especially poor against the run on third downs as opponents converted 59% of 3rd and 1-4 yards and 57% of 3rd and 5-7 yards when they ran the ball
Things look even worse when you factor in fourth down conversions.
  • Florida converted four 4th down plays resulting in 10 points and would’ve been more if not for a Franks fumble in the red zone
  • North Carolina converted a 4th & 17 on their game-winning drive
  • Central Michigan converted three 4th down attempts on a 17-play drive in the fourth quarter that resulted in a TD to make the game a one-score game
  • Georgia Tech faked a punt for a TD in a huge play where the defense was on the field
  • Louisville converted a 4th & 8 and gained 36 yards. If not for an interception, they would’ve scored on this drive. Then, on a 4th & 1, Louisville ran it 58 yards for a TD. A third 4th down conversion came on a drive that later ended on downs
If you put the 4th down attempts and conversions for each P5 team into their totals, Miami drops to 34th out of 65, or 48th percentile.
  • Perhaps the worst data point of all of these is the fact that Miami allowed an unsightly 33 out of 106 3rd & long (7+ yards) to be converted, which results in a 31.1% successful conversion rate
  • Taking this one step further, Miami allowed successful conversions of 3rd & 11+ yards on 7 of 41 attempts, or 17.1%
To add a little context to the numbers, there were seven P5 defenses who allowed a lower conversion percentage than Miami did on 3rd & long on ALL 3rd down attempts!
  • For comparison’ sake, Alabama faced 85 3rd & long situations and allowed a conversion 11 times, for a rate of 12.9%. Miami’s rate was two-and-a-half times higher than Alabama’s rate of conversion allowed, and Miami allowed a higher rate of conversions on 3rd & 11+ than Alabama did on 3rd & 7+
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Film
The numbers are clear; Miami has to improve on money downs and this is especially true in 3rd & long situations as well as against the run on 3rd downs. What could be contributing to these issues on defense? Let’s take a look at the film and try and identify some areas for improvement.

Over Aggressiveness
This is a 3rd & 11 against a running team and a running QB with Miami leading 21-7. Miami has nine defenders engaged right at the LOS and two safeties deep. Knowles is sitting 18 yards from the LOS and is truly doing very little. Louisville gets exactly what they want as Miami blitzes both LB’s into the A-gap. They send the slot into motion to get the Striker to trail him and that opens up the entirety of the field to the boundary. This is a QB run all the way. Garvin loses his lane discipline and flies upfield, the Rousseau flies upfield and the QB has an easy lane to run through and an OL as a lead blocker. This is an easy 1st down and was something that never needed to happen; if they played this conservative and rallied up to make a tackle, they’re off the field. Miami’s lives and dies with blitzes far too often.
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Again, you can’t allow your edge to get collapsed inside on a 3rd and long against a scrambling QB. He doesn’t make it all the way on this play, but he got too close on a 3rd & 12 because there wasn’t any integrity with the rush.
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This is a 3rd & 14 and Miami is up by a large amount. Why are you blitzing your nickel corner here? In reality, it just created a bunch of confusion for the defense, as I have no idea where Carter is going here. He has the RB out of the backfield, but completely abandons him because he’s worried about the slot WR coming across the field (I guess?). Shaq is in a different position here trying to get out to the slot. This defense is another example where they play their SS all over the place, as the striker (Finley) goes back to SS and Carter drops into the box in this defense. It’s a screen to the RB that goes for huge yardage.
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I want to take the time to show instances where they play it well. In this case, they play coverage with a Cover-1 man (man-to-man defense all across) and have the MLB play the “hook zone” or the middle portion of the field where a receiver would settle in for a short comeback route. Garvin stands up and instead of rushing upfield recklessly, he spies Franks and tries to force him to make a tight window throw or scramble. Franks scrambles and Garvin makes the tackle on the edge. This defense takes athletic edge rushers and a S with excellent speed to be able to help deep, or to come downhill quickly and help with a deep square-in if the receiver doesn’t go deep.
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It’s interesting that Miami plays a 3-man rush with coverage behind it much more often on 3rd and medium (like 5 yards) than they do on 3rd and long. Here is another 3-man rush with a spy backing out. When I’m watching it, I said that’s an easy conversion if the QB sees the second slant because the defender is way too far off. He did and it was easy. Miami had a 2nd and 22 on this drive, Franks slips out of a Rousseau sack, runs for 17 yards, brings up the 3rd and short, then they convert after getting a 4th down conversion they shouldn’t have, earlier. It all adds up, and this is why every plays contributes to the next.
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Miscommunication
There are few things that will kill your defense quicker than miscommunication. Miami is in Cover-1 Robber on this play, but they don’t play it well. There are different ways to play this defense, but I’m fairly certain the error is made by Frierson here (blue circle). He needs to follow Tutu all the way across, while Carter will jump the cross coming into his zone. Instead, Frierson cuts back as if he’s going to be replaced by another defender on the shallow cross and Atwell takes this to the house. This is a total bust by the defense and while most wouldn’t be able to erase the angle around the edge like Atwell did here, Frierson can’t be making this mistake in that spot. If you want to know why Miami is recruiting all the safeties that they are, it’s because they ask them to do a lot of things in this defense and they play three on most plays, and sometimes four.
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You can see that everyone did their job except for Frierson. Carter jumped the crosser, Bandy carried the dig, Ivey comes to act as deep support behind Carter. Frierson bites on the mesh and cost his team. Hall takes too shallow of an angle (something he did quite often in 2019) and it’s a house call. Lane integrity with the pass rush is off again, as well.
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Another case where miscommunication kills the defense. This is a simple route and they have the defense for it, but the defender doesn’t do his job. Bandy has the wheel route of the backfield and Hall has to take the TE in the seam who waltzes into the end zone untouched.
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The Safeties for Miami improved as the season went on, but especially in this Florida game they were poor. Carter here is way inside of where he should be, standing directly on the hash, but he knows this is a corner blitz to the boundary side and he has to get over there. He should be at least two steps further outside, knowing where he will have to get and no TE to that side threatening the seam. The result is an easy 1st down, and you can also debate the merits of a CB blitz when the QB hasn’t been hurting you with his passing for most of the game and you have the lead here.
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Again, they try that CB blitz from the boundary and you can see immediately someone messed up. The outside WR is running free and has his hand up already. Pitts is running down the seam and Miami only has Carter out there to cover both. Carter isn’t a coverage specialist to begin with and this is another case of asking players to do things they aren’t great at. CB blitz is picked up and it’s easy peasy for the offense. The scheme is actually asking Shaq to get depth to make the QB throw it over him and Hall to cover Pitts deep here. Hall is late getting over and Shaq falls for the play-action fake.
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I watch this play from Carter over-and-over and still cannot understand what is holding him on that hash. He’s single-high, there is no TE to run the seam to that side (he’s on the other side). Why is Carter not three steps to his left and more in the middle of the formation based on the leverage of the offense? It makes no sense to be where he is and contributed heavily to Miami losing this game.
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This is on Carter, not really Frierson.
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Run Fits
I wrote earlier about how successful teams were at running the ball on 3rd down to pick up conversions and this is an example of why. Miami has this play all accounted for. Finley has to take the bounce (C gap), DE has to set an edge that causes the RB to bubble and give Finley time to get there. Shaq has the B-gap, or the outside shoulder of #83. Playing the outside shoulder of the blocker causes the RB to have to cutback into the A-gap, where Pinckney is flowing from behind to fill that gap.
View attachment 123443

Instead, Shaq takes the inside shoulder of #83 and gives the blocker all the leverage and the runner a lane to hit going “downhill” which really just means with a full head of steam and a straight line.
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You can tell that Shaq heard about how he took on that block earlier in the game, because here he does attack the correct shoulder and forces the RB back into his help, but this time Pinckney overruns his gap and allows for a cutback lane and this running play goes down to the 3-yard line. The defense is in position, there were just a lot of poor run fits by the LB’s and S’s last year.
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You hear the coaches talk all the time about the need for their CB’s to be able to tackle and it’s because they really are an extension of your run defense. There are two situations where a CB has a “run fit” or “gap” in run defense: 1. When his WR comes down and blocks down on the edge defender, the CB has to replace the Edge as responsible for that gap in run defense. 2. When he does not have a receiver to his side of the field he immediately becomes the wide defender in the run game. This is a 4th down, and Miami has their second chance to stop Florida in plus territory. Bandy does not have a receiver to his side and is therefore the wide edge defender in the run game. Bandy takes the red angle when he should’ve taken the green angle. If Bandy takes the green angle he forces the runner back into his help. He does the one thing he cannot do here and allows the runner the outside corner and he gets the 1st down. Go where the runner is going, not where he is.
View attachment 123446

It’s not really a run fit, but this little swing pass is an extension of the run game. This is a 2nd and 10 and they have him hemmed in to bring up a long 3rd down. Instead he slips through and picks up the 1st down. You absolutely hate seeing your LB Pinckney get blocked by #1 on this play. Hall stops his feet and it’s a busted run fit that hurts badly.
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Lack of Coverage
This is a 4th & 5 with Miami holding a 6-point lead. I don’t understand having both Shaq and McCloud on the field here against 5-wide. Shaq is forced to play coverage downfield and it’s an easy conversion. Get another DB on the field in these situations and put your players in a position to succeed. They played a contain rush to keep the QB in the pocket, which plays even further into the idea of having more coverage on the field, rather than Shaq or McCloud. Florida floods their receivers to that side and leaves Shaq to pattern match to that side (meaning he carries Pitts until he goes deep, then Blades picks him up and he drops off onto the outside WR when he comes short). WR runs a whip route (fakes slant or post and then breaks back outside) and it’s an easy conversion.
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3rd & goal from the 9 and you’d like to see Miami play a coverage package here. Another example of Miami playing three safeties (Knowles, Cart, Hall) and two LB’s (Shaq and Pinckney). I’d rather take Pinckney out on this play and have Finley in the game or another coverage player. Rousseau makes an excellent play with his length and stops the play, but I’m trying to highlight the actual personnel usage in this situation.
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It worked last time thanks to Florida running the QB, but not this time as the two LB’s on the field are absolutely exposed in coverage. Why does Shaq have his back to the QB? He’s just supposed to get depth here, he’s not in man. Pinckney falls for the outside juke on the Texas route by the RB, falls down, and it’s a walk-in TD on 3rd & goal from the 8. Not great, Bob.
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Bottom Line
Looking solely at the overall numbers the defense appears to be quite solid, but digging deeper there are clear and obvious problems with the defense that must be improved for the team to take another step forward in 2020.
  • The coaches need to put the defense in a better position to succeed through reduced aggression on 3rd & long. Too often Miami would send six or more rushers looking for the big play and allow the offense to convert. The coaching staff has been quoted as saying, “this is who we are” several times, but on those down’s you don’t need a big play as much as you need a smart play.
  • Miami’s LB’s struggled to maintain gap control in their run fits last year, leading to an inordinate number of successful pickups on the ground. They had reliable tackling and solid leadership, but didn’t produce enough big plays to exhibit poor run fits.
  • Safety play struggled- especially early in the season- and there were communication and alignment issues all season long. With the move to more-and-more three safety defensive alignments, the defense either needs to be simplified, or the safeties need to study more to avoid the coverage busts that cost them games last year.
  • Asking the LB’s to play coverage against athletic pass catchers was a mismatch with Miami’s defense all season long. The defensive staff needs to play more coverage players and fewer LB’s in 2020.
As noted in the Data section of this article, Miami struggled in all areas of defending money downs; running plays, deep passing, QB scrambles. It is on the coaching staff to design a defense that rallies and tackles on long yardage 3rd downs, while still maintaining the havoc and big plays that have defined this defense over the past several years. On a 3rd & 11 getting a sack is not as impactful as it is on 1st & 10, on longer conversion 3rd downs, relying on your front to get pressure and force short passes is the way to improvement in overall performance. Luckily for Miami, 3rd down defense is not especially sticky year-over-year, meaning with small improvements you could see Miami go from mediocre to great on money downs.
Awesome work!
This defense needs good tackle play and it wasn’t where it was the 2 previous years imo.
This defense looked very impressive with McIntosh and then Willis. That one position alone will make this defense click. We just didn’t have that level of 3 tech play last year and it hurt us.
 
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There are two glaring issues with this analysis, one of which is mentioned in the last section:
1) This analysis penalizes the defense for the cost of being overly aggressive (i.e. giving up some 3rd downs), but does not take into account the benefit, which is field position improvements from a sack/TFL or TO. Obviously a TO is less valuable when the alternative is a punt, but even in this comparison it creates 20-40 yards of field position.
2) If there is little stickiness year-to-year, a big portion of 3rd down success is luck.

Given these two points, idk if one can conclude Miami was "mediocre" on 3rd down. 3rd down D could stand to improve, of course, but this analysis misses one of the positive impacts of Miami's style and doesn't take into account randomness.

I'm not sure how you came to either conclusion based on what I wrote and showed, but thank you for the feedback, nonetheless.
 
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Awesome work!
This defense needs good tackle play and it wasn’t where it was the 2 previous years imo.
This defense looked very impressive with McIntosh and then Willis. That one position alone will make this defense click. We just didn’t have that level of 3 tech play last year and it hurt us.

You are certainly correct that our play at the 3T has slipped in the last two years and improving that would make a big impact on all phases of defense.
 
@Lance Roffers this is one of my favorite of your posts so far.

I'm surprised about the poor run fits from veterans like Shaq and Pinckney. You think they're coached to be too aggressive and make the big play rather than maintain gap integrity? Or just lapses in concentration from game tiredness and stuff like that?

Do you think Safety play will be improved next year? I think guys like Rayshawn Jenkins, Jamal Carter and Redwine had similar issues early in their careers but cleaned them up with experience. I'm a bit worried seeing Amari Carter in Year 3 positioning himself inexplicably on the wrong hash, as well as some of the Frierson/Gurvan Hall blown coverages you highlighted
 
I don’t understand rushing 3 defensive linemen, I don’t give a **** what the down and distance is! Put your 4 best defensive linemen on the field and get to the quarterback!!!

Because if you're expecting "quick game" (QB catch and throw) it makes no sense to send 4 rushers.
Some DC's feel it's better to use that 4th rusher to sit underneath a quick hitch (or any other quick route at the sticks).
 
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Great analysis. Definitely think Baker put us in poor schematic positions on 3rd downs but the "we are who we are" comment shows a stubbornness we need to be mitigated to take the next step as a defense. I do however think having more athletic linebackers who can actually run and cover will make a huge difference.
Everything discussed above can be relatively easy to correct. More time in the system, a better understanding of coverage responsibilities, repetition and general player development are all factors that will naturally lead to significant improvement. That is the good news.

The bad news.......The quote from Baker where he says, "We are who we are" is rather telling. To be blunt I find that quote to be alarming if not flat out disturbing. It shows a stunning disregard for or the inability to comprehend situational football. That or Baker is using that dopey cliche as a cover for his incompetence. It's not good either way. Seriously try to imagine repeatedly giving up 3rd and medium to long just because the DC places more value on being cute and saying,"Hey look at me! Look how aggressive and complex I am! Look at my super awesome delayed CB blitz on 4th and 17!" Stubborn is not the right word. Incompetence, stupidity and a complete lack of common sense are more fitting imo.

Baker reminds me a little of Diaz when Manolo first became a DC. Since then Diaz has learned much about the finer points of being a DC and is much more seasoned and versatile. This has been said often but the Baker hire was not a good move. Baker had no P5 DC experience and it showed last year. At times last season it almost seemed as if Baker thought he was still coaching La Tech caliber talent. It was like he had no idea how to properly use the defensive talent he inherited. The good news here is that I don't see Diaz putting his coaching future in the hands of Blake Baker. I fully expect for Diaz to exert full control of the defense this season whenever that is.
 
I definitely agree that the over aggressiveness, especially on third and long is stupid and pointless. I like the idea of pressuring in early downs and then playing coverage on third and long. Drop your seven or eight and make the quarterback beat you with a long throw. It’s just too easy when you blitz and the QB has a quick dump to a guy running through a vacated area. It really requires everyone to do everything perfectly. Sometimes Baker over thinks himself but Manny did a lot of that too early on and he seemed to find the right grove after some trial and error. Hopefully Baker can back off the corner blitzes on third and 9.

The linebacker run fits gave me fits. I felt almost like they let Shaq and Pink freelance in the run game because they were out of position so much. Too much eagerness to make the big tfl instead of playing your assignment.

Safety play against Florida was abysmal but it got better for the most part as guys got more experience. Carter looks uncomfortable playing away from the LOS. They’ve done a good job with bringing in safety talent and I like the position versatility. I honestly believe that James Williams will play linebacker here just so they can put another versatile safer-type player on the field. They’ve been a bit hamstrung with linebackers who are weak in coverage so I’m curious to see what guys like Huff and Brooks can do as they’re a bit more athletic.
 
Always look forward to these posts. It confirms the memo that has to be sent out.

Executive Summary:

A. Be disciplined and elementary on 3rd down and long. You were already the smarter, micro-managing, short guy on the first two downs. Let players, play. Let Canes, eat.

The memo you're looking for is: Bring onion back home!

But if coach diaz wants to lay the fate of his job at the hands of the other Blake, that's on him!
 
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Everything discussed above can be relatively easy to correct. More time in the system, a better understanding of coverage responsibilities, repetition and general player development are all factors that will naturally lead to significant improvement. That is the good news.

The bad news.......The quote from Baker where he says, "We are who we are" is rather telling. To be blunt I find that quote to be alarming if not flat out disturbing. It shows a stunning disregard for or the inability to comprehend situational football. That or Baker is using that dopey cliche as a cover for his incompetence. It's not good either way. Seriously try to imagine repeatedly giving up 3rd and medium to long just because the DC places more value on being cute and saying,"Hey look at me! Look how aggressive and complex I am! Look at my super awesome delayed CB blitz on 4th and 17!" Stubborn is not the right word. Incompetence, stupidity and a complete lack of common sense are more fitting imo.

Baker reminds me a little of Diaz when Manolo first became a DC. Since then Diaz has learned much about the finer points of being a DC and is much more seasoned and versatile. This has been said often but the Baker hire was not a good move. Baker had no P5 DC experience and it showed last year. At times last season it almost seemed as if Baker thought he was still coaching La Tech caliber talent. It was like he had no idea how to properly use the defensive talent he inherited. The good news here is that I don't see Diaz putting his coaching future in the hands of Blake Baker. I fully expect for Diaz to exert full control of the defense this season whenever that is.
I just hope now with improved speed & athleticism in the back 7 it curbs his reliance on the blitz. Our front four pass rush should be sufficient to make life **** for opposing qb's w/o gimmicky delayed blitzes.
 
Glad to see that 4th - 17 was a proper meme/metaphor afterall. Sometimes you swear your gut is true, but the data says otherwise. Sometimes the data confirms it.

Great work, as usual . . .
 
I'm not sure how you came to either conclusion based on what I wrote and showed, but thank you for the feedback, nonetheless.

I don't see where you gave the defense credit for the excess field position it generated on 3rd downs due to its "over aggressiveness".

An *ideal* analysis would have said, "the defense's struggles stopping 3rd down conversions cost the team X pts vs average, but the 3rd down havoc plays generated Y pts vs average, for a net effect of Z pts vs average on 3rd down." Average being P5 or w/e benchmark you want to use.

I'm not saying all analyses needs to be *ideal* in order to be meaningful and interesting, but this is an important part of the equation and it should at least be discussed, even if only qualitatively. You only point out that havoc plays are less valuable in 3rd down - without acknowledging (quantitatively pr qualitatively) that they're still valuable and should not be ignored when assessing this team's 3rd down performance.

It's like saying a great shooter's shooting % isn't that great, without mention that their makes are worth more. Miami's stops are worth more because they tend to be negative plays. That's all I'm saying.
 
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I don't see where you gave the defense credit for the excess field position it generated on 3rd downs due to its "over aggressiveness".

An *ideal* analysis would have said, "the defense's struggles stopping 3rd down conversions cost the team X pts vs average, but the 3rd down havoc plays generated Y pts vs average, for a net effect of Z pts vs average on 3rd down." Average being P5 or w/e benchmark you want to use.

I'm not saying all analyses needs to be *ideal* in order to be meaningful and interesting, but this is an important part of the equation and it should at least be discussed, even if only qualitatively. You only point out that havoc plays are less valuable in 3rd down - without acknowledging (quantitatively pr qualitatively) that they're still valuable and should not be ignored when assessing this team's 3rd down performance.

It's like saying a great shooter's shooting % isn't that great, without mention that their makes are worth more. Miami's stops are worth more because they tend to be negative plays. That's all I'm saying.

1. The net impacts of creating negative plays is addressed through Expected Points Added for a defense. Less appropriately, but still included with Yards Per Play as well.

2. It is FAR more impactful to a game to get an offense off the field at a higher clip than it is to give up an above-average number of 3rd & long conversions, while also creating a higher than average sack rate (Miami was quite reliant on sacks to get stops)

Not sure what you're saying with the shooter analogy, since their makes are worth the same as anyone else's makes. I do understand you're wanting to state that the defense isn't getting credit for when they do stop the offense, they tend to do so while gaining field position (through negative plays). That is all built-in to the data already though.

Side note: you might enjoy my previous series entitled "Hidden Points" which breaks down the math on much of this for different aspects of the game.

Appreciate the back-and-forth and differing perspective.
 
Great write-up.

It confirms what a lot of us have been saying.

We don't play a fundamentally sound defense.

The scheme is more of a gimmick predicated around disrupting the backfield. Its a gamble of creating chaos in the backfield hoping to ruin the play, while allowing RB's and TE's to be uncovered.

Its easy to gameplan against especially if you have a strong offensive line, and it's going to continue to be exposed until Baker is removed.
Exactly. We will sack and turnover teams with poor lines, which can lead to big wins. But with a good line, we will be exposed, particularly for gash plays.
 
Because if you're expecting "quick game" (QB catch and throw) it makes no sense to send 4 rushers.
Some DC's feel it's better to use that 4th rusher to sit underneath a quick hitch (or any other quick route at the sticks).
I gotcha so lineup 4 and drop one. If I remember right Randy would run that defense and Big Vince got an interception dropping back.
 
I gotcha so lineup 4 and drop one. If I remember right Randy would run that defense and Big Vince got an interception dropping back.

Kinda boils down to film study and opponent tendencies.

If through film study you find out that the opponent's offense throws "quick game" on downs that are 3rd & medium, it may not make much sense to send 4 (or more) rushers because you know there's an 85% chance the ball is coming out of the QB's hands immediately. You're not gonna get to the QB.

You're probably gonna get hitch, quick slant or the RB out of the backfield, so rather than send a 4th rusher some DC's will drop him into that quick slant/hitch zone, hoping to create a turnover.
 
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